From: Andrew Jarrette
Message: 62446
Date: 2009-01-10
>disposal.
> --- In cybalist@yahoogroups.com, "Andrew Jarrette" <anjarrette@> wrote:
> >
> > --- In cybalist@yahoogroups.com, "Brian M. Scott" <BMScott@> wrote:
> > >
> > > At 4:01:46 PM on Friday, January 9, 2009, Andrew Jarrette
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > [...]
> > >
> > > > I've heard of Gmc *bidjan being considered a derivative of
> > > > the *bheidh- root,
> > >
> > > Seems to be pretty standard: I find it in both Watkins and
> > > Ringe.
> > >
> > > Brian
> > >
> >
> > If it's not too much to ask, do you think you could explain the
> > semantic development of "trust" (or "persuade") to "request, pray
> > for"? It would help me at least to accept the standardness of the
> > idea of *bidjan deriving from *bheidh-, rather than considering that
> > idea marginal, which is what I tend to do because of the apparent
> > (to me) semantic distance between *bidjan and *bheidh- (not, of
> > course, that what I think matters to anyone, it would just be a
> > favour if you could explain the semantic development to me).
>
> Benvéniste is one of those French thinkers, who, when you read him,
> you think 'but this explains everything!' and afterwards you think
> 'what did he actually say?'
>
> Here (Indo-European Language and Society) he explains PIE *bheidh-
>
> 'The expression par excellence for the notion of 'loyalty', the one
> which is the general and at the same time the best characterized in
> western Indo-European, is the Latin fide:s with its etymological
> family. It is attested in several spheres of usage, i.e. with
> religious, moral, philosophical, and even legal senses. We shall now
> consider this group of words in order to define as far as we may the
> modalities of the notion by study of the normal relations.
> To the family of Latin fide:s corresponds in Greek that of peíthomai
> (peíthomai). The verbal form appears first in the middle, the present
> active peítho: 'persuade' being secondary. It was coined at a fairly
> late date from peíthomai 'obey'. In accordance with an ancient
> morphological alternation, peíthomai has as its perfect the active
> form pépoitha, like gígnomai: gégona. This root provided an abstract
> noun pístis 'trust, faith', with an adjective pistós, 'faithful'. From
> pistós comes a new present tense pistoûn 'to make trustworthy, to
> oblige, to bind by promise' and also pisteúo: 'to have faith', which
> has persisted.
> Apart from Latin and Greek we can only cite with the same sense a noun
> form in Albanian be: 'oath', from *bhoida:. There are numerous other
> phonetically comparable forms, but the sense is so different that we
> can not justify the relationship which the form suggests: this is
> where the difficulties of the problem begin. The facts are first those
> of Germanic: the Gothic form beidan goes back to *bheidh-, that is the
> same prototype as Latin fide:s, foedus, but the Gothic verb means
> 'prosdokãn, to expect, the await, to endure', the same as Old Icel.
> biða. Further, with another grade of the root, we have Gothic baidjan,
> with a different meaning again, because it translates Greek anankázein
> 'compel', just like Old Saxon be:dian 'compel', force'. The sense of
> 'constrain' permits however a connexion with the Slavic be^diti, which
> translates the same verb anankázein, and with the noun be^da,
> ´anánke:, necessity, compulsion'.
> These connexions are registered in all the etymological dictionaries
> with the uncertainties and doubts imposed by the disparity of the
> meanings.
> We do not venture either a firm rejection or adoption of these
> correspondences seeing that we have no means of either justifying or
> refuting them. It is, however, important to know how far we can extend
> the comparison. Must we limit ourselves to Greek and Latin forms for
> the reconstruction ? But if Germanic and Slavic forms are to be
> included, this modifies the semantic data. Before coming to a decision
> it will be necessary to examine the sense of the terms in those
> languages where it can be rigorously defined.
> Let us first consider the Latin words. We must first state that the
> sense of fide:s is defined inaccurately in our dictionaries, so
> inaccurately as to make it impossible even to understand the
> construction of its first uses. To study it we must have recourse to
> the article on fide:s in the Latin Thesaurus, where the different
> meanings are correctly classified.
> If we continue to translate fide:s by 'faith', certain essential
> expressions like fidem habere, fides est mihi, frequently met with in
> the language of comedy, risk being understood in exactly the opposite
> sense: thus Plautus, Pseudolus 467: parvam esse apud te mihi fidem
> ipse intellego. If we translate mihi fides est with 'I have faith (in
> you), I give (you) my confidence' we arrive at exactly the opposite of
> what it actually means, which in fact is '(I have known for a long
> time that you despise me because) I understand well that you have only
> very little confidence in me'. Another example in Plautus, Amph. 555:
> facis ut tuis nulla apud te fides sit is to be understood in the same
> way: 'You have no confidence in your people'.
> The context and the authentic syntax of this turn of phrase impose a
> translation which seems to reverse the expected connections: fides est
> mihi apud aliquem signifies 'somebody has confidence in me'. To
> translate fide:s more literally, let us replace 'confidence' by
> 'credit'. The literal translation of fides est mihi apud aliquem
> becomes 'I have credit with somebody'; this is really the equivalent
> of 'I inspire confidence in him' or 'he has confidence in me'. Thus
> the Latin notion of fide:s establishes between the partners an inverse
> relationship to that which we generally understand under the notion of
> 'confidence'. In the expression 'I have confidence in somebody', the
> confidence is something belonging to me which I can put into his hands
> and which he disposes of. In the Latin expression mihi est fides apud
> aliquem it is the other who puts his trust in me and it is at my
> Thus the term fide:s is bound up with the construction est mihi, thethis.
> proper expression of possession ; and this 'possession' is determined
> by the preposition apud 'chez', indicating the partner. The
> 'possessor' of the fide:s thus holds a security which he deposits
> 'with' (apud) somebody: this shows that fide:s is really the 'credit'
> which one enjoys with one's partner. All the early examples confirm
> This term figures in still another well-known turn of phrase where theapparent.
> sense also requires rectification. This is the appeal: pro divom fidem
> made to obtain the help of the gods, or again: di, obsecro vestram
> fidem, 'O gods, I beseech you for your fide:s'. Since fide:s
> designates the confidence which the speaker inspires in his
> interlocutor, and which he enjoys with him, it follows that it is for
> him a 'guarantee' to which he can have recourse. The fide:s that
> mortals have with the gods assures them in return of a guarantee: it
> is this divine guarantee which he invokes in his distress.
> Once we have penetrated into these syntactical and semantic relations,
> it is the French phrase avoir confiance en quelqu'un 'to have
> confidence in someone' which looks peculiar. It is right to say 'je
> donne ma foi, j'accorde ma confiance', 'I give my trust, I bestow my
> confidence'. Something of mine is in effect given to somebody who now
> possesses it ('he possesses my confidence'). But how to explain that
> we also say 'to have confidence' in somebody ? How can one give a
> thing and have it at the same time ? The answer should not be sought
> in French or English itself; the expression 'avoir confiance' 'to have
> confidence' is incomprehensible except as a translation of the Latin
> fidem habere. We must thus explain fide:s in this new construction
> which is quite different from the other. This time it is the verb
> which we must consider. In fact, the turn of phrase fidem habere
> alicui is to be understood in the same manner as honorem habere alicui
> 'to bestow honour on somebody', and signifies thus 'to bestow on
> somebody the fide:s which belongs to him'. Thus Terence, Eun. 197:
> forsitan hic mihi parvam habeat fidem 'perhaps this man will have
> little confidence, will bestow on me slight fide:s'.
> Here we see the relation between hic mihi fidem habet and the ancient
> est mihi fides apud illum. By a natural development we pass in the
> language of rhetoric to the expression fidem facere orationi 'to
> create fide:s in an oration', that is credibility. From now on it is
> the utterance which possesses a fide:s and it is possible to say est
> orationi fides apud auditorem 'the speech possesses this fide:s vis a
> vis the hearer' and thus becomes capable of persuading him. From this
> by abbreviation we get fidem auditori facere, literally 'to make
> credibility for the hearer'.
> It is from this that fide:s develops into a subjective notion, no
> longer the confidence which is inspired in somebody, but the trust
> which is placed in somebody. This conversion was the essential stage
> in the evolution. It would be possible to follow the development of
> the notion in familiar phrases: se in fidem ac dicionem populi Romani
> tradere 'to deliver oneself into the fide:s and power of the Roman
> people' ; fide:s is joined to dicio, the power to dispose of somebody;
> or se in fidem et potestatem alicuius tradere, 'to surrender oneself
> into the fide:s and power of someone'. Just like potesta:s and dicio:,
> fide:s is a quality acknowledged in the victor.
> These equivalents bring to light another aspect of fide:s. If we
> review the different words associated with fide:s and the
> circumstances in which they are employed, it will be seen that the
> partners in 'trust' are not in the same situation, the one who holds
> the fide:s placed in him by a man has this man at his mercy. This is
> why fide:s becomes almost synonymous with dicio: and potesta:s. In
> their primitive form these relations involved a certain reciprocity,
> placing one's fide:s in somebody secured in return his guarantee and
> his support. But this very fact underlines the inequality of the
> conditions. It is authority which is exercised at the same time as
> protection for somebody who submits to it, an exchange for, and to the
> extent of, his submission. This relationship implies the power of
> constraint on one side and obedience on the other. It is seen very
> clearly in the precise signification of the Latin word foedus (from
> *bhoides-), a 'pact' established originally between two unequal
> partners. This is shown in certain poetic usages: omnes foedere
> naturae certo discrimina servant 'all, in conformity with the laws
> fixed by nature, preserve the characteristics which differentiate
> them' (Lucretius V, 923); has leges alternaque foedera certis imposuit
> natura locis 'nature has imposed these laws and eternal pacts on
> certain localities' (Vergil, Georgics I, 60). The constraining power
> of foedus was later extended to both parties.
> The Latin forms illuminate the various aspects of the sense thanks to
> the phraseology of the religious and legal language. Outside Latin,
> these notions have become laicized and specialized. Nevertheless, the
> verb peíthomai in Greek 'I let myself be persuaded, I obey' still
> enables us to recognize that 'persuasion' is equivalent to, or
> develops to, the sense 'obedience' and presupposes a constraint
> although the institutional form of this submission is no longer
> We may now return to, and make more precise, the etymologicalAll interesting, but the sense-developments he describes are not
> relationships with the Germanic and Slavic forms. Up to now
> etymologists have left open the question whether the sense of Gothic
> beidan 'to wait, bide' should or should not be connected with that of
> fide:s, etc. The same is true of Old Slavic be^da 'constraint,
> anánke:'. Similar problems often arise if we take too summary a view
> of the relationships of sense. The first condition is to observe and
> to define exactly the terms in question in the language itself. If we
> examine how Gothic employs beidan 'to expect, prosdékhesthai,
> prosdokân', it will be noticed, particularly in Luke II, 25 'he was a
> just and pious man' beidands laþonais Israelis, prosdekhómenos
> parákle:sin tou~ Israe:l, 'who expected the consolation of Israel'.
> Here the 'expectance' is a 'confidence' in the fulfilment of the
> prophesy of Isaia (33, 20). Mark XV, 43 was silba beidands
> þiudangardjos gudis (Joseph of Arima-thea, a notable member of the
> Council) 'who also expected the kingdom of God'. Here, also, 'expect'
> is equivalent to 'place one's confidence in . . .'. Luke II, 38 þaim
> usbeidandam laþon Jairusaulwmos 'to those who expected the deliverance
> of Jerusalem'; it is still an event expected with confidence that is
> given by conviction. This is indirectly confirmed in the context of I
> Cor. XIII, 7 where gabeidiþ 'hupomenei, endures' follows þulaiþ
> 'excuses', galaubeiþ 'believes', weneiþ 'hopes'. There thus is in
> Gothic no break with the ancient sense of *bheidh-, but only an
> evolution from 'put one's confidence in somebody or something' to
> 'expect', and even if it is taken in an ordinary sense, this verb
> always refers to a hopeful expectation.
> Nor is there any difficulty in admitting that beidan has its causative
> in baidjan. Here, again, scholars have found an insurmountable
> obstacle in the sense of baidjan, which translates Gr. anankázein
> 'constrain'; how could 'constrain' be the causation of'expect'? The
> fact is that the following has not been taken into consideration:
> Gothic uses two different verbs to render anankázein. One is nauþjan
> 'to exercise a physical constraint' and the other baidjan, indicating
> only a moral constraint, which is that of persuasion (cf. II Cor. XII,
> 11; Gal. II, 3, 14). It is thus possible to imagine that the connexion
> between beidan and baidjan is analogous to that of Gr. peíthomai 'to
> trust somebody' and peítho: 'to get somebody to obey'. The same is
> true of Old Slavic be^da 'constraint'. In this light the old unity can
> be restored and we can see that, as between the senses of the Greek
> and Latin forms and those of Germanic and Slavic, there was a
> weakening and especially a loss of the institutional sense. This is in
> the main due presumably to the emergence of another expression for
> faith and fidelity in Germanic, i.e. Treue and the related terms.
> The history of fide:s goes beyond its etymological relatives. It has
> long been noticed that fide:s in Latin is the abstract noun
> corresponding to a different verb: cre:do:. This suppletive
> relationship has been studied by A. Meillet [ Mémoires de la Société
> de Linguistique de Paris, XXII, 1922, 215ff] who has shown that the
> ancient connexion between cre:do: and fide:s was revived in
> Christianity: it was then that fide:s, a profane expression, evolved
> towards the sense of 'religious faith' and cre:dere 'believe' towards
> that of 'to confess one's faith'.
> We must here anticipate the conclusions of an analysis which will be
> found below (p. 138ff.) in order to demonstrate what predetermined to
> some extent that fide:s and cre:do: should function in this suppletive
> way. Cre:do:, we shall see, is literally 'to place one's *kred' that
> is 'magical powers', in a person from whom one expects protection
> thanks to 'believing' in him. Now it seems to us that fide:s, in its
> original sense of 'credit, credibility', implying dependence on the
> one who fidem habet alicui, designates a notion very close to that of
> *kred. It is easy to see, once the old root noun *kred was lost in
> Latin, how fide:s could take its place as a substantive corresponding
> to credo. In these two terms we are back once again with notions in
> which there is no distinction between law and religion: the whole of
> ancient law is only a special domain regulated by practices and rules
> which are still pervaded by mysticism.'
>
>
> Torsten
>