Re: offer-command-announce-awake-aware-inquire-learn-understand-know

From: Andrew Jarrette
Message: 62446
Date: 2009-01-10

--- In cybalist@yahoogroups.com, "tgpedersen" <tgpedersen@...> wrote:
>
> --- In cybalist@yahoogroups.com, "Andrew Jarrette" <anjarrette@> wrote:
> >
> > --- In cybalist@yahoogroups.com, "Brian M. Scott" <BMScott@> wrote:
> > >
> > > At 4:01:46 PM on Friday, January 9, 2009, Andrew Jarrette
> > > wrote:
> > >
> > > [...]
> > >
> > > > I've heard of Gmc *bidjan being considered a derivative of
> > > > the *bheidh- root,
> > >
> > > Seems to be pretty standard: I find it in both Watkins and
> > > Ringe.
> > >
> > > Brian
> > >
> >
> > If it's not too much to ask, do you think you could explain the
> > semantic development of "trust" (or "persuade") to "request, pray
> > for"? It would help me at least to accept the standardness of the
> > idea of *bidjan deriving from *bheidh-, rather than considering that
> > idea marginal, which is what I tend to do because of the apparent
> > (to me) semantic distance between *bidjan and *bheidh- (not, of
> > course, that what I think matters to anyone, it would just be a
> > favour if you could explain the semantic development to me).
>
> Benvéniste is one of those French thinkers, who, when you read him,
> you think 'but this explains everything!' and afterwards you think
> 'what did he actually say?'
>
> Here (Indo-European Language and Society) he explains PIE *bheidh-
>
> 'The expression par excellence for the notion of 'loyalty', the one
> which is the general and at the same time the best characterized in
> western Indo-European, is the Latin fide:s with its etymological
> family. It is attested in several spheres of usage, i.e. with
> religious, moral, philo­sophical, and even legal senses. We shall now
> consider this group of words in order to define as far as we may the
> modalities of the notion by study of the normal relations.
> To the family of Latin fide:s corresponds in Greek that of peíthomai
> (peíthomai). The verbal form appears first in the middle, the present
> active peítho: 'persuade' being secondary. It was coined at a fairly
> late date from peíthomai 'obey'. In accordance with an ancient
> morpho­logical alternation, peíthomai has as its perfect the active
> form pépoitha, like gígnomai: gégona. This root provided an abstract
> noun pístis 'trust, faith', with an adjective pistós, 'faithful'. From
> pistós comes a new present tense pistoûn 'to make trustworthy, to
> oblige, to bind by promise' and also pisteúo: 'to have faith', which
> has persisted.
> Apart from Latin and Greek we can only cite with the same sense a noun
> form in Albanian be: 'oath', from *bhoida:. There are numerous other
> phonetically comparable forms, but the sense is so different that we
> can not justify the relationship which the form suggests: this is
> where the difficulties of the problem begin. The facts are first those
> of Germanic: the Gothic form beidan goes back to *bheidh-, that is the
> same prototype as Latin fide:s, foedus, but the Gothic verb means
> 'prosdokãn, to expect, the await, to endure', the same as Old Icel.
> biða. Further, with another grade of the root, we have Gothic baidjan,
> with a different meaning again, because it translates Greek anankázein
> 'compel', just like Old Saxon be:dian 'compel', force'. The sense of
> 'constrain' permits however a connexion with the Slavic be^diti, which
> translates the same verb anankázein, and with the noun be^da,
> ´anánke:, necessity, compulsion'.
> These connexions are registered in all the etymological dictionaries
> with the uncertainties and doubts imposed by the disparity of the
> meanings.
> We do not venture either a firm rejection or adoption of these
> correspondences seeing that we have no means of either justifying or
> refuting them. It is, however, important to know how far we can extend
> the comparison. Must we limit ourselves to Greek and Latin forms for
> the reconstruction ? But if Germanic and Slavic forms are to be
> included, this modifies the semantic data. Before coming to a decision
> it will be necessary to examine the sense of the terms in those
> languages where it can be rigorously defined.
> Let us first consider the Latin words. We must first state that the
> sense of fide:s is defined inaccurately in our dictionaries, so
> inaccurately as to make it impossible even to understand the
> construction of its first uses. To study it we must have recourse to
> the article on fide:s in the Latin Thesaurus, where the different
> meanings are correctly classified.
> If we continue to translate fide:s by 'faith', certain essential
> expres­sions like fidem habere, fides est mihi, frequently met with in
> the language of comedy, risk being understood in exactly the opposite
> sense: thus Plautus, Pseudolus 467: parvam esse apud te mihi fidem
> ipse intellego. If we translate mihi fides est with 'I have faith (in
> you), I give (you) my confidence' we arrive at exactly the opposite of
> what it actually means, which in fact is '(I have known for a long
> time that you despise me because) I understand well that you have only
> very little confidence in me'. Another example in Plautus, Amph. 555:
> facis ut tuis nulla apud te fides sit is to be understood in the same
> way: 'You have no confidence in your people'.
> The context and the authentic syntax of this turn of phrase impose a
> translation which seems to reverse the expected connections: fides est
> mihi apud aliquem signifies 'somebody has confidence in me'. To
> translate fide:s more literally, let us replace 'confidence' by
> 'credit'. The literal translation of fides est mihi apud aliquem
> becomes 'I have credit with somebody'; this is really the equivalent
> of 'I inspire confidence in him' or 'he has confidence in me'. Thus
> the Latin notion of fide:s establishes between the partners an inverse
> relationship to that which we generally understand under the notion of
> 'con­fidence'. In the expression 'I have confidence in somebody', the
> confidence is something belonging to me which I can put into his hands
> and which he disposes of. In the Latin expression mihi est fides apud
> aliquem it is the other who puts his trust in me and it is at my
disposal.
> Thus the term fide:s is bound up with the construction est mihi, the
> proper expression of possession ; and this 'possession' is determined
> by the preposition apud 'chez', indicating the partner. The
> 'possessor' of the fide:s thus holds a security which he deposits
> 'with' (apud) somebody: this shows that fide:s is really the 'credit'
> which one enjoys with one's partner. All the early examples confirm
this.
> This term figures in still another well-known turn of phrase where the
> sense also requires rectification. This is the appeal: pro divom fidem
> made to obtain the help of the gods, or again: di, obsecro vestram
> fidem, 'O gods, I beseech you for your fide:s'. Since fide:s
> designates the confidence which the speaker inspires in his
> interlocutor, and which he enjoys with him, it follows that it is for
> him a 'guarantee' to which he can have recourse. The fide:s that
> mortals have with the gods assures them in return of a guarantee: it
> is this divine guarantee which he invokes in his distress.
> Once we have penetrated into these syntactical and semantic relations,
> it is the French phrase avoir confiance en quelqu'un 'to have
> confidence in someone' which looks peculiar. It is right to say 'je
> donne ma foi, j'accorde ma confiance', 'I give my trust, I bestow my
> confidence'. Something of mine is in effect given to somebody who now
> possesses it ('he possesses my confidence'). But how to explain that
> we also say 'to have confidence' in somebody ? How can one give a
> thing and have it at the same time ? The answer should not be sought
> in French or English itself; the expression 'avoir confiance' 'to have
> confidence' is incomprehensible except as a translation of the Latin
> fidem habere. We must thus explain fide:s in this new construction
> which is quite different from the other. This time it is the verb
> which we must consider. In fact, the turn of phrase fidem habere
> alicui is to be understood in the same manner as honorem habere alicui
> 'to bestow honour on somebody', and signifies thus 'to bestow on
> somebody the fide:s which belongs to him'. Thus Terence, Eun. 197:
> forsitan hic mihi parvam habeat fidem 'perhaps this man will have
> little confidence, will bestow on me slight fide:s'.
> Here we see the relation between hic mihi fidem habet and the ancient
> est mihi fides apud illum. By a natural development we pass in the
> language of rhetoric to the expression fidem facere orationi 'to
> create fide:s in an oration', that is credibility. From now on it is
> the utterance which possesses a fide:s and it is possible to say est
> orationi fides apud auditorem 'the speech possesses this fide:s vis a
> vis the hearer' and thus becomes capable of persuading him. From this
> by abbrevi­ation we get fidem auditori facere, literally 'to make
> credibility for the hearer'.
> It is from this that fide:s develops into a subjective notion, no
> longer the confidence which is inspired in somebody, but the trust
> which is placed in somebody. This conversion was the essential stage
> in the evolution. It would be possible to follow the development of
> the notion in familiar phrases: se in fidem ac dicionem populi Romani
> tradere 'to deliver oneself into the fide:s and power of the Roman
> people' ; fide:s is joined to dicio, the power to dispose of somebody;
> or se in fidem et potestatem alicuius tradere, 'to surrender oneself
> into the fide:s and power of someone'. Just like potesta:s and dicio:,
> fide:s is a quality acknowledged in the victor.
> These equivalents bring to light another aspect of fide:s. If we
> review the different words associated with fide:s and the
> circumstances in which they are employed, it will be seen that the
> partners in 'trust' are not in the same situation, the one who holds
> the fide:s placed in him by a man has this man at his mercy. This is
> why fide:s becomes almost synonymous with dicio: and potesta:s. In
> their primitive form these relations involved a certain reciprocity,
> placing one's fide:s in somebody secured in return his guarantee and
> his support. But this very fact underlines the inequality of the
> conditions. It is authority which is exercised at the same time as
> protection for somebody who submits to it, an exchange for, and to the
> extent of, his submission. This relationship implies the power of
> constraint on one side and obedience on the other. It is seen very
> clearly in the precise significa­tion of the Latin word foedus (from
> *bhoides-), a 'pact' established originally between two unequal
> partners. This is shown in certain poetic usages: omnes foedere
> naturae certo discrimina servant 'all, in conformity with the laws
> fixed by nature, preserve the characteristics which differentiate
> them' (Lucretius V, 923); has leges alternaque foedera certis imposuit
> natura locis 'nature has imposed these laws and eternal pacts on
> certain localities' (Vergil, Georgics I, 60). The constraining power
> of foedus was later extended to both parties.
> The Latin forms illuminate the various aspects of the sense thanks to
> the phraseology of the religious and legal language. Outside Latin,
> these notions have become laicized and specialized. Nevertheless, the
> verb peíthomai in Greek 'I let myself be persuaded, I obey' still
> enables us to recognize that 'persuasion' is equivalent to, or
> develops to, the sense 'obedience' and presupposes a con­straint
> although the institutional form of this submission is no longer
apparent.
> We may now return to, and make more precise, the etymological
> relationships with the Germanic and Slavic forms. Up to now
> etymologists have left open the question whether the sense of Gothic
> beidan 'to wait, bide' should or should not be connected with that of
> fide:s, etc. The same is true of Old Slavic be^da 'constraint,
> anánke:'. Similar problems often arise if we take too summary a view
> of the relationships of sense. The first condition is to observe and
> to define exactly the terms in question in the language itself. If we
> examine how Gothic employs beidan 'to expect, prosdékhesthai,
> prosdokân', it will be noticed, particularly in Luke II, 25 'he was a
> just and pious man' beidands laþonais Israelis, prosdekhómenos
> parákle:sin tou~ Israe:l, 'who expected the consolation of Israel'.
> Here the 'expectance' is a 'confidence' in the fulfilment of the
> prophesy of Isaia (33, 20). Mark XV, 43 was silba beidands
> þiudangardjos gudis (Joseph of Arima-thea, a notable member of the
> Council) 'who also expected the kingdom of God'. Here, also, 'expect'
> is equivalent to 'place one's confidence in . . .'. Luke II, 38 þaim
> usbeidandam laþon Jairusaulwmos 'to those who expected the deliverance
> of Jerusalem'; it is still an event expected with confidence that is
> given by conviction. This is indirectly confirmed in the context of I
> Cor. XIII, 7 where gabeidiþ 'hupomenei, endures' follows þulaiþ
> 'excuses', galaubeiþ 'believes', weneiþ 'hopes'. There thus is in
> Gothic no break with the ancient sense of *bheidh-, but only an
> evolution from 'put one's confidence in somebody or something' to
> 'expect', and even if it is taken in an ordinary sense, this verb
> always refers to a hopeful expectation.
> Nor is there any difficulty in admitting that beidan has its causative
> in baidjan. Here, again, scholars have found an insurmountable
> obstacle in the sense of baidjan, which translates Gr. anankázein
> 'constrain'; how could 'constrain' be the causation of'expect'? The
> fact is that the following has not been taken into consideration:
> Gothic uses two different verbs to render anankázein. One is nauþjan
> 'to exercise a physical constraint' and the other baidjan, indicating
> only a moral constraint, which is that of persuasion (cf. II Cor. XII,
> 11; Gal. II, 3, 14). It is thus possible to imagine that the connexion
> between beidan and baidjan is analogous to that of Gr. peíthomai 'to
> trust somebody' and peítho: 'to get somebody to obey'. The same is
> true of Old Slavic be^da 'constraint'. In this light the old unity can
> be restored and we can see that, as between the senses of the Greek
> and Latin forms and those of Germanic and Slavic, there was a
> weakening and especially a loss of the institutional sense. This is in
> the main due presumably to the emergence of another expression for
> faith and fidelity in Germanic, i.e. Treue and the related terms.
> The history of fide:s goes beyond its etymological relatives. It has
> long been noticed that fide:s in Latin is the abstract noun
> corresponding to a different verb: cre:do:. This suppletive
> relationship has been studied by A. Meillet [ Mémoires de la Société
> de Linguistique de Paris, XXII, 1922, 215ff] who has shown that the
> ancient connexion between cre:do: and fide:s was revived in
> Christianity: it was then that fide:s, a profane expression, evolved
> towards the sense of 'religious faith' and cre:dere 'believe' towards
> that of 'to confess one's faith'.
> We must here anticipate the conclusions of an analysis which will be
> found below (p. 138ff.) in order to demonstrate what predetermined to
> some extent that fide:s and cre:do: should function in this suppletive
> way. Cre:do:, we shall see, is literally 'to place one's *kred' that
> is 'magical powers', in a person from whom one expects protection
> thanks to 'believing' in him. Now it seems to us that fide:s, in its
> original sense of 'credit, credibility', implying dependence on the
> one who fidem habet alicui, designates a notion very close to that of
> *kred. It is easy to see, once the old root noun *kred was lost in
> Latin, how fide:s could take its place as a substantive corresponding
> to credo. In these two terms we are back once again with notions in
> which there is no distinction between law and religion: the whole of
> ancient law is only a special domain regulated by practices and rules
> which are still pervaded by mysticism.'
>
>
> Torsten
>


All interesting, but the sense-developments he describes are not
difficult to understand. The one that is difficult for me to
understand is "have confidence in" or "put credit in" or "engender
credit in oneself to" or "trust" or "obey" or "get one to obey" TO
"ask for, request from someone, pray for, beg for". I can't seem to
enlighten myself about the necessary sense-development. Is it "get
somebody to have enough faith in you that they are willing to give you
something"? (Sort of like "bamboozle" or "swindle" someone out of
something > "beg" someone for something (thus getting it without
paying for it), perhaps?)

Also: *bhoida: (> Albanian <be:> "oath") and *bhoides- (> Latin
<foedus> "pact") have *d instead of *dh -- why are they included here,
or is this a mistake on the part of Benvéniste?

Andrew