--- In
cybalist@yahoogroups.com, "Andrew Jarrette" <anjarrette@...> wrote:
>
> --- In cybalist@yahoogroups.com, "Brian M. Scott" <BMScott@> wrote:
> >
> > At 4:01:46 PM on Friday, January 9, 2009, Andrew Jarrette
> > wrote:
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > I've heard of Gmc *bidjan being considered a derivative of
> > > the *bheidh- root,
> >
> > Seems to be pretty standard: I find it in both Watkins and
> > Ringe.
> >
> > Brian
> >
>
> If it's not too much to ask, do you think you could explain the
> semantic development of "trust" (or "persuade") to "request, pray
> for"? It would help me at least to accept the standardness of the
> idea of *bidjan deriving from *bheidh-, rather than considering that
> idea marginal, which is what I tend to do because of the apparent
> (to me) semantic distance between *bidjan and *bheidh- (not, of
> course, that what I think matters to anyone, it would just be a
> favour if you could explain the semantic development to me).
Benvéniste is one of those French thinkers, who, when you read him,
you think 'but this explains everything!' and afterwards you think
'what did he actually say?'
Here (Indo-European Language and Society) he explains PIE *bheidh-
'The expression par excellence for the notion of 'loyalty', the one
which is the general and at the same time the best characterized in
western Indo-European, is the Latin fide:s with its etymological
family. It is attested in several spheres of usage, i.e. with
religious, moral, philosophical, and even legal senses. We shall now
consider this group of words in order to define as far as we may the
modalities of the notion by study of the normal relations.
To the family of Latin fide:s corresponds in Greek that of peíthomai
(peíthomai). The verbal form appears first in the middle, the present
active peítho: 'persuade' being secondary. It was coined at a fairly
late date from peíthomai 'obey'. In accordance with an ancient
morphological alternation, peíthomai has as its perfect the active
form pépoitha, like gígnomai: gégona. This root provided an abstract
noun pístis 'trust, faith', with an adjective pistós, 'faithful'. From
pistós comes a new present tense pistoûn 'to make trustworthy, to
oblige, to bind by promise' and also pisteúo: 'to have faith', which
has persisted.
Apart from Latin and Greek we can only cite with the same sense a noun
form in Albanian be: 'oath', from *bhoida:. There are numerous other
phonetically comparable forms, but the sense is so different that we
can not justify the relationship which the form suggests: this is
where the difficulties of the problem begin. The facts are first those
of Germanic: the Gothic form beidan goes back to *bheidh-, that is the
same prototype as Latin fide:s, foedus, but the Gothic verb means
'prosdokãn, to expect, the await, to endure', the same as Old Icel.
biða. Further, with another grade of the root, we have Gothic baidjan,
with a different meaning again, because it translates Greek anankázein
'compel', just like Old Saxon be:dian 'compel', force'. The sense of
'constrain' permits however a connexion with the Slavic be^diti, which
translates the same verb anankázein, and with the noun be^da,
´anánke:, necessity, compulsion'.
These connexions are registered in all the etymological dictionaries
with the uncertainties and doubts imposed by the disparity of the
meanings.
We do not venture either a firm rejection or adoption of these
correspondences seeing that we have no means of either justifying or
refuting them. It is, however, important to know how far we can extend
the comparison. Must we limit ourselves to Greek and Latin forms for
the reconstruction ? But if Germanic and Slavic forms are to be
included, this modifies the semantic data. Before coming to a decision
it will be necessary to examine the sense of the terms in those
languages where it can be rigorously defined.
Let us first consider the Latin words. We must first state that the
sense of fide:s is defined inaccurately in our dictionaries, so
inaccurately as to make it impossible even to understand the
construction of its first uses. To study it we must have recourse to
the article on fide:s in the Latin Thesaurus, where the different
meanings are correctly classified.
If we continue to translate fide:s by 'faith', certain essential
expressions like fidem habere, fides est mihi, frequently met with in
the language of comedy, risk being understood in exactly the opposite
sense: thus Plautus, Pseudolus 467: parvam esse apud te mihi fidem
ipse intellego. If we translate mihi fides est with 'I have faith (in
you), I give (you) my confidence' we arrive at exactly the opposite of
what it actually means, which in fact is '(I have known for a long
time that you despise me because) I understand well that you have only
very little confidence in me'. Another example in Plautus, Amph. 555:
facis ut tuis nulla apud te fides sit is to be understood in the same
way: 'You have no confidence in your people'.
The context and the authentic syntax of this turn of phrase impose a
translation which seems to reverse the expected connections: fides est
mihi apud aliquem signifies 'somebody has confidence in me'. To
translate fide:s more literally, let us replace 'confidence' by
'credit'. The literal translation of fides est mihi apud aliquem
becomes 'I have credit with somebody'; this is really the equivalent
of 'I inspire confidence in him' or 'he has confidence in me'. Thus
the Latin notion of fide:s establishes between the partners an inverse
relationship to that which we generally understand under the notion of
'confidence'. In the expression 'I have confidence in somebody', the
confidence is something belonging to me which I can put into his hands
and which he disposes of. In the Latin expression mihi est fides apud
aliquem it is the other who puts his trust in me and it is at my disposal.
Thus the term fide:s is bound up with the construction est mihi, the
proper expression of possession ; and this 'possession' is determined
by the preposition apud 'chez', indicating the partner. The
'possessor' of the fide:s thus holds a security which he deposits
'with' (apud) somebody: this shows that fide:s is really the 'credit'
which one enjoys with one's partner. All the early examples confirm this.
This term figures in still another well-known turn of phrase where the
sense also requires rectification. This is the appeal: pro divom fidem
made to obtain the help of the gods, or again: di, obsecro vestram
fidem, 'O gods, I beseech you for your fide:s'. Since fide:s
designates the confidence which the speaker inspires in his
interlocutor, and which he enjoys with him, it follows that it is for
him a 'guarantee' to which he can have recourse. The fide:s that
mortals have with the gods assures them in return of a guarantee: it
is this divine guarantee which he invokes in his distress.
Once we have penetrated into these syntactical and semantic relations,
it is the French phrase avoir confiance en quelqu'un 'to have
confidence in someone' which looks peculiar. It is right to say 'je
donne ma foi, j'accorde ma confiance', 'I give my trust, I bestow my
confidence'. Something of mine is in effect given to somebody who now
possesses it ('he possesses my confidence'). But how to explain that
we also say 'to have confidence' in somebody ? How can one give a
thing and have it at the same time ? The answer should not be sought
in French or English itself; the expression 'avoir confiance' 'to have
confidence' is incomprehensible except as a translation of the Latin
fidem habere. We must thus explain fide:s in this new construction
which is quite different from the other. This time it is the verb
which we must consider. In fact, the turn of phrase fidem habere
alicui is to be understood in the same manner as honorem habere alicui
'to bestow honour on somebody', and signifies thus 'to bestow on
somebody the fide:s which belongs to him'. Thus Terence, Eun. 197:
forsitan hic mihi parvam habeat fidem 'perhaps this man will have
little confidence, will bestow on me slight fide:s'.
Here we see the relation between hic mihi fidem habet and the ancient
est mihi fides apud illum. By a natural development we pass in the
language of rhetoric to the expression fidem facere orationi 'to
create fide:s in an oration', that is credibility. From now on it is
the utterance which possesses a fide:s and it is possible to say est
orationi fides apud auditorem 'the speech possesses this fide:s vis a
vis the hearer' and thus becomes capable of persuading him. From this
by abbreviation we get fidem auditori facere, literally 'to make
credibility for the hearer'.
It is from this that fide:s develops into a subjective notion, no
longer the confidence which is inspired in somebody, but the trust
which is placed in somebody. This conversion was the essential stage
in the evolution. It would be possible to follow the development of
the notion in familiar phrases: se in fidem ac dicionem populi Romani
tradere 'to deliver oneself into the fide:s and power of the Roman
people' ; fide:s is joined to dicio, the power to dispose of somebody;
or se in fidem et potestatem alicuius tradere, 'to surrender oneself
into the fide:s and power of someone'. Just like potesta:s and dicio:,
fide:s is a quality acknowledged in the victor.
These equivalents bring to light another aspect of fide:s. If we
review the different words associated with fide:s and the
circumstances in which they are employed, it will be seen that the
partners in 'trust' are not in the same situation, the one who holds
the fide:s placed in him by a man has this man at his mercy. This is
why fide:s becomes almost synonymous with dicio: and potesta:s. In
their primitive form these relations involved a certain reciprocity,
placing one's fide:s in somebody secured in return his guarantee and
his support. But this very fact underlines the inequality of the
conditions. It is authority which is exercised at the same time as
protection for somebody who submits to it, an exchange for, and to the
extent of, his submission. This relationship implies the power of
constraint on one side and obedience on the other. It is seen very
clearly in the precise signification of the Latin word foedus (from
*bhoides-), a 'pact' established originally between two unequal
partners. This is shown in certain poetic usages: omnes foedere
naturae certo discrimina servant 'all, in conformity with the laws
fixed by nature, preserve the characteristics which differentiate
them' (Lucretius V, 923); has leges alternaque foedera certis imposuit
natura locis 'nature has imposed these laws and eternal pacts on
certain localities' (Vergil, Georgics I, 60). The constraining power
of foedus was later extended to both parties.
The Latin forms illuminate the various aspects of the sense thanks to
the phraseology of the religious and legal language. Outside Latin,
these notions have become laicized and specialized. Nevertheless, the
verb peíthomai in Greek 'I let myself be persuaded, I obey' still
enables us to recognize that 'persuasion' is equivalent to, or
develops to, the sense 'obedience' and presupposes a constraint
although the institutional form of this submission is no longer apparent.
We may now return to, and make more precise, the etymological
relationships with the Germanic and Slavic forms. Up to now
etymologists have left open the question whether the sense of Gothic
beidan 'to wait, bide' should or should not be connected with that of
fide:s, etc. The same is true of Old Slavic be^da 'constraint,
anánke:'. Similar problems often arise if we take too summary a view
of the relationships of sense. The first condition is to observe and
to define exactly the terms in question in the language itself. If we
examine how Gothic employs beidan 'to expect, prosdékhesthai,
prosdokân', it will be noticed, particularly in Luke II, 25 'he was a
just and pious man' beidands laþonais Israelis, prosdekhómenos
parákle:sin tou~ Israe:l, 'who expected the consolation of Israel'.
Here the 'expectance' is a 'confidence' in the fulfilment of the
prophesy of Isaia (33, 20). Mark XV, 43 was silba beidands
þiudangardjos gudis (Joseph of Arima-thea, a notable member of the
Council) 'who also expected the kingdom of God'. Here, also, 'expect'
is equivalent to 'place one's confidence in . . .'. Luke II, 38 þaim
usbeidandam laþon Jairusaulwmos 'to those who expected the deliverance
of Jerusalem'; it is still an event expected with confidence that is
given by conviction. This is indirectly confirmed in the context of I
Cor. XIII, 7 where gabeidiþ 'hupomenei, endures' follows þulaiþ
'excuses', galaubeiþ 'believes', weneiþ 'hopes'. There thus is in
Gothic no break with the ancient sense of *bheidh-, but only an
evolution from 'put one's confidence in somebody or something' to
'expect', and even if it is taken in an ordinary sense, this verb
always refers to a hopeful expectation.
Nor is there any difficulty in admitting that beidan has its causative
in baidjan. Here, again, scholars have found an insurmountable
obstacle in the sense of baidjan, which translates Gr. anankázein
'constrain'; how could 'constrain' be the causation of'expect'? The
fact is that the following has not been taken into consideration:
Gothic uses two different verbs to render anankázein. One is nauþjan
'to exercise a physical constraint' and the other baidjan, indicating
only a moral constraint, which is that of persuasion (cf. II Cor. XII,
11; Gal. II, 3, 14). It is thus possible to imagine that the connexion
between beidan and baidjan is analogous to that of Gr. peíthomai 'to
trust somebody' and peítho: 'to get somebody to obey'. The same is
true of Old Slavic be^da 'constraint'. In this light the old unity can
be restored and we can see that, as between the senses of the Greek
and Latin forms and those of Germanic and Slavic, there was a
weakening and especially a loss of the institutional sense. This is in
the main due presumably to the emergence of another expression for
faith and fidelity in Germanic, i.e. Treue and the related terms.
The history of fide:s goes beyond its etymological relatives. It has
long been noticed that fide:s in Latin is the abstract noun
corresponding to a different verb: cre:do:. This suppletive
relationship has been studied by A. Meillet [ Mémoires de la Société
de Linguistique de Paris, XXII, 1922, 215ff] who has shown that the
ancient connexion between cre:do: and fide:s was revived in
Christianity: it was then that fide:s, a profane expression, evolved
towards the sense of 'religious faith' and cre:dere 'believe' towards
that of 'to confess one's faith'.
We must here anticipate the conclusions of an analysis which will be
found below (p. 138ff.) in order to demonstrate what predetermined to
some extent that fide:s and cre:do: should function in this suppletive
way. Cre:do:, we shall see, is literally 'to place one's *kred' that
is 'magical powers', in a person from whom one expects protection
thanks to 'believing' in him. Now it seems to us that fide:s, in its
original sense of 'credit, credibility', implying dependence on the
one who fidem habet alicui, designates a notion very close to that of
*kred. It is easy to see, once the old root noun *kred was lost in
Latin, how fide:s could take its place as a substantive corresponding
to credo. In these two terms we are back once again with notions in
which there is no distinction between law and religion: the whole of
ancient law is only a special domain regulated by practices and rules
which are still pervaded by mysticism.'
Torsten