Dear Dhivan,
Thanks for a well written, well researched article
on the oraparaṃ problem and the
meaning of naccasārī na paccasārī.
I did suggest a meaning for naccasārī na paccasārī as “who
neither ignores this world or pays attention to it”, deriving accasārī from the verb ati + sṛ and paccasārī from the verb prati + sṛ or prati + smṛ. I discuss the issues on pages 336-342 of my dissertation.
Later in that work I also did suggest the possibility of an echo construction,
and your Jātaka reference does
support that position – thank you for finding that.
On the orapāraṃ
meaning, I argue for the plain and simple meaning of “this shore and the far
shore” and equate the far shore with nibbāna,
as did Brough, but with less consternation, nor do I see any Mahāyāna
influence. I find that there are indeed two strains of thought in early
Buddhism, one of which I would characterize, not as “non-dualist” but as “transcending
dualism” and the other as dualistic, – where concepts like saṃsāra and nibbāna are
juxtaposed and contrasted. In the first case (as Ven. Nyanaponika says, “beyond
opposites”), there are numerous examples in the early works which can
be interpreted as transcending dualism, as for example the whole of MN 1 (which
is about what happens when one construes an observer and observed – maññati- and the way a Buddha sees – pariññatantaṃ), and the Buddha’s
instructions to Bāhiya, (diṭṭhe diṭṭhamattaṃ
bhavissati, etc., “in the seen is merely seen”, that is, no object nor
observer) and its conclusion, yato tvaṃ,
bāhiya, na tena tato tvaṃ, bāhiya, na tattha; yato tvaṃ, bāhiya, na tattha,
tato tvaṃ, bāhiya, nevidha na huraṃ na ubhayamantarena. esevanto dukkhassā”ti.
“When there is no perception by a someone
(tena), then there is no there, when ethere
is no there, there is neither here nor there, nor in between the two. That is
the end of suffering”, or later in the Sn,
yaṃ
pubbe taṃ visosehi, pacchā te māhu kiñcanaṃ
majjhe ce no gahessasi, upasanto carissasi (1098).
Dry up the past, may there be nothing in the future
If you do not grab onto the present, you will wander tranquilly
where the Buddha seems to reject both the extremes
and the middle (past, present and future).
or
ajjhattamevupasame
na aññato bhikkhu santimeseyya.
ajjhattaṃ upasantassa, natthi attā kuto nirattā vā
(919).
When a monk is calm internally he should not seek
peace from another
For the one who is at peace internally, there is no self, or how much less so,
not-self (Norman translates as “nothing taken up… laid down”, but see
commentary on this and similar constructions).
And there are numerous other instances where we are
enjoined not to grasp any opposites but to trust to the middle way of dependent
origination which transcends them, like numerous suttas in the SN Nidānasaṃyutta (Upavāṇasuttaṃ, Lokāyatikasuttaṃ,
etc.).
This is a very complicated subject. In the end one
has to reject any label for the Buddha’s teachings, whether monism, pluralism, dualism
(as Van. Nyanaponika says in his Heart of
Buddhist Meditation, p. 26), or non-dualism.
Thanks for raising and discussing so eloquently and thoroughly
some of the main issues.
Mettā,
Bryan
From: "dhivanjones@... [palistudy]" <palistudy@yahoogroups.com>
To: palistudy@yahoogroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, November 30, 2016 8:44 AM
Subject: [palistudy] Article on the Uraga verses (Sn 1–17) [1 Attachment]
[Attachment(s) from dhivanjones@... [palistudy] included below]
Dear Pāli friends,
I have attached to this message a recently published article on the Uraga verses. I had been pondering for some time the meaning of so bhikkhu jahāti orapāraṃ since this refrain seems paradoxical, given that Buddhists are usually enjoined to cross over from the near shore of saṃsāra to the far shore of nirvāṇa. In the end I found a discourse in the Saṃyutta-nikāya (S 35:241) which offered a possible solution, and I worked out that solution in detail against all existing scholarship, as you can see. The theme of metaphor in early Buddhist poetry really interests me, as it opens up the sense of how early Buddhists communicated or thought about the Dhamma, in wider ways than that of lists and doctrines. I engage with the work of two members of this Pāli study group:
In the conclusion (p.94) I make the claim that the Uraga verses might be seen as implying an expression of early Buddhist non-dualism, a claim which engages with an article by Bhikkhu Bodhi concerning the absence of non-dualist expressions of the Dhamma in the Pāli canon.
In an Appendix (p.100f.), I include (positive) discussion of Brian Levman's idea that the phrase accasārī na paccasārī (in Sn 8–13) might be an 'echo-type construction' typical of specifically Indian languages.
I would of course enjoy reading any comments or feedback!
Thanks and good wishes,
Dhivan