RE: vibhūta in AN 11 .10

Dear all involved in this interesting discussion,



I want to comment on the passage from Neumann quoted by Lennart, namely:



"In reference to our passage above, Being and Non-Being are the boundaries
of any possible perception: bhavo and vibhavo or bhavo and abhavo as
anti-thesis. Very clearly to be differentiated has to be the other vibhavo,
when it appears in the the presentation of the threefold thirst, where it
appears in a climactical triad as kamatanha, bhavatanha, vibhavatanha:
sensual thirst, thirst for existence, thirst for being well. The "vi-" is
not a preposition of separation but a preposition of increase/strengthening.”



I don’t think it is necessary to appeal to Buddhaghosa or the commentaries to point out that Neumann is quite mistaken here. There is sufficient evidence in the Nikāyas that vibhavataṇhā cannot mean “thirst for being well.” Nor is there opposition in the Nikāyas between bhava and abhava, for the simple reason that, in so far as I can determine, the word ‘abhava’, in the sense of non-being, does not occur in the Nikāyas. The compound ‘bhavābhava’, which we do find quite regularly, seems to have a repetitive sense, “in existence after existence,” or “in one state of existence or another.” In the passages I have checked, it does not seem to be positing a contrast between “being” and “non-being.”



But let’s turn to vibhavataṇhā. To support Neumann’s interpretation, one would have to find at least one text showing that this term means “thirst for being well.” There are, to be sure, suttas that speak about craving for wealth, power, long life, status, etc., but these are not offered as exemplifications of vibhavataṇhā. And we can find enough suttas illustrating the sense of vibhavataṇhā to conclude that it must mean “craving for an ending to existence,” a type of craving, as the commentaries explain, accompanied by an underlying view of the person as a substantial self.



One such text is Itivuttaka 49, where a contrast is drawn between adherents of two kinds of views (diṭṭhigatehi pariyuṭṭhitā): those who “stick fast” (olīyanti) and those who “exceed the mark” (atidhāvanti). Those who “stick fast” are devas and humans who delight in existence (bhavārāmā devamanussā bhavaratā bhavasammuditā) and do not welcome the dhamma taught for the cessation of existence (bhavanirodhāya dhamme desiyamāne cittaṃ na pakkhandati). These are obviously people in the grip of bhavataṇhā who rationalize their craving by formulating and adopting bhavadiṭṭhi. 



Their opponents, who “exceed the mark,” are described thus: “Some being repelled, humiliated, and disgusted with existence, delight in vibhava, [asserting] ‘When, with the breakup of the body, after death, this self (or being) is annihilated, destroyed, and does not exist after death, that is peaceful, that is exquisite, that accords with reality’ (bhaven’eva kho pan’eke aṭṭīyamānā harāyamānā jigucchamānā vibhavaṃ abhinandanti – yato kira, bho, ayaṃ attā [satto (sī. ka.)] kāyassa bhedā paraṃ maraṇā ucchijjati vinassati na hoti paraṃ maraṇā; etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ etaṃ yāthāvanti).”



Note that these thinkers “delight in vibhava.” Since abhinandinī is a word descriptive of taṇhā in the formula for the second noble truth, this implies that it is vibhavataṇhā that leads to the view that there is a self (or real being) that is annihilated and destroyed at death. The third verb in this series, na hoti, seems to be related to the noun vibhava: having existed during life, this self or being ceases to be at death; it undergoes vibhava, the vanishing of its existence.



It’s interesting, too, that in the verses attached to this sutta, vibhava is used with approbation. The monk who has understood what has come to be is freed from craving for one state of existence or another, and with the “vibhava of what has come to be” he does not come back to repeated existence (bhūtassa vibhavā bhikkhu nāgacchati punabbhavanti). Here vibhava can be affirmed because it is the ending of “what has come to be” rather than of a substantial self. In fact, vibhava here is almost synonymous with nirodha.



Another sutta that helps us determine the meaning of vibhavataṇhā is the Brahmajāla Sutta (DN no. 1). The annhiliationists are described thus: Idha, bhikkhave, ekacco samaṇo vā brāhmaṇo vā evaṃvādī hoti evaṃdiṭṭhi ‘yato kho, bho, ayaṃ attā ... kāyassa bhedā ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṃ maraṇā, ettāvatā kho, bho, ayaṃ attā sammā samucchinno hotī’ti. Ittheke sato sattassa ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ paññapenti. Again we find the string of three verbs asserted about the assumed self— ucchijjati vinassati, na hoti paraṃ maraṇā—and we further find the three nouns in apposition as representing the fate of the self: ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ. Certainly vibhava here can’t mean “well being,” or even “transcendence,” but must be synonymous with uccheda and vināsa, annihilation and destruction. And since the BJ Sutta declares that all the theorists who adopt these views do so because they are in the grip of craving (taṇhāgatānaṃ), this suggests that the craving responsible for the view of annihilation is vibhavataṇhā, just as the craving responsible for views of an eternal self is bhavataṇhā.



Still a third sutta that contributes to our understanding of vibhavataṇhā is the Pañcattaya Sutta (MN no. 102). In the section on the annihilationists, it is said that there are ascetics who teach the annihilation of an existent being, again with vibhava as the third term in the series: te samaṇabrāhmaṇā sato sattassa ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ paññapenti. These ascetics ridicule the views of the eternalists, saying that by their views they all declare their attachment to existing after death (āsattiṃyeva abhivadanti ‘iti pecca bhavissāma, iti pecca bhavissāmā’ti). But the Buddha says that while these annihilationists formulate their views from fear of and loathing for personal existence (sakkāya), they continue to circle around personal existence (te sakkāyabhayā sakkāyaparijegucchā sakkāyaññeva anuparidhāvanti anuparivattanti.), just as a dog tied to a post, while struggling to break free, only continues to run around the post. In this case, the loathing for personal existence must be a derivative of vibhavataṇhā. Such craving issues in the view of annihilation, but because it remains a craving tied to sakkāya, even if in a negative way, it cannot lead to liberation from sakkāya.



Still other suttas can be cited and discussed, but these three should suffice to establish that vibhavataṇhā cannot mean “thirst for being well,” or anything synonymous with that expression. They further indicate that the meaning of vibhava in vibhavataṇhā must be the same as in other contexts where it means a distorted desire for the ending of bhava, usually with the underlying supposition of a substantial self to be annihilated and destroyed.



This being said, I will have to vibhava from this discussion, since on Friday I have to leave the monastery for a few weeks.



With metta,

Bhikkhu Bodhi





From: palistudy@yahoogroups.com [mailto:palistudy@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Khristos Nizamis
Sent: Wednesday, October 17, 2012 3:12 AM
To: palistudy@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [palistudy] vibhūta in AN 11.10



  

Dear Lennart, and All,

I wish I had more time to devote to this very interesting discussion;
unfortunately, unlike some of you guys, I can only do things much more
slowly and interruptedly. There are quite a few things I'd like to
contribute, but I have to "steal time" from daily life to read, to check
references, to translate, etc., in order to get things clear and cogent.
I'd much rather be doing this than other things, but, well, so it goes.
However, I felt like making a couple of comments and suggestions here.

First, thanks for the references to Ven. Ñāṇananda's *Nibbāna: The Mind
Stilled*: you have a penchant for throwing this text into a discussion, and
always at a timely moment and in a very pertinent way. I've read some
parts of that work before, but unfortunately not yet all of it. But I have
now read through Sermons 11, 16 and 17 very closely and with deep
interest. I've made quite a few notes, but it's impossible to go through
these here; only to mention one or two things that might be helpful, or
provocative, about the v-bhū issue.

Second, thanks also for presenting the excellent Neumann quotations.
Incidentally, I don't find any fundamental incompatibility between what
Neumann says and what Ven. Ñāṇananda says.

In reference to our passage above Being and Non-Being are the boundaries
> of any possible perception: bhavo and vibhavo or bhavo and abhavo as
> anti-thesis. Very clearly to be differentiated has to be the other
vibhavo,
> when it appears in the the presentation of the threefold thirst, where it
> appears in a climactical triad as kamatanha, bhavatanha, vibhavatanha:
> sensual thirst, thirst for existence, thirst for being well. The "vi-" is
> not a preposition of separation but a preposition of
increase/strengthening.

When I read this, my immediate instinct was that Neumann's reading 'felt
very right'. It makes very good sense, in this case; it really feels right
here. More from Neumann, followed by your comment:

"This usage of a preposition with opposing meanings is something which can
be found quite often in Indian languages and is well known; it has
developed into two opposite directions, similarly to our (German) prefix
"ver-", for instance in "vermoegen, vergnuegen" vs. "verderben, vergessen"
etc and in a double meaning "versehen, versprechen", etc. Vibhavo as
Development, Power, Regency, Fullness, Abundance, Happiness is the more
basic idea (see footnote 697) while the meaning of vibhavo = abhavo is
relatively rare and usually appears as an anti-thesis.

Interestingly enough, in his comment on MN 44, Neumann mentions that the
"vibhavo" can also "equally often" appear in the negative sense and in that
case resemble the abhava as in "bhavabhava":

Indeed, and I would think that the following from MN 11 (at M I 65) is just
one obvious example:

dvemā, bhikkhave, diṭṭhiyo — bhavadiṭṭhi ca vibhavadiṭṭhi ca. ye hi keci,
bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā bhavadiṭṭhiṃ allīnā bhavadiṭṭhiṃ upagatā
bhavadiṭṭhiṃ ajjhositā, vibhavadiṭṭhiyā te paṭiviruddhā. ye hi keci,
bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā vibhavadiṭṭhiṃ allīnā vibhavadiṭṭhiṃ
upagatā vibhavadiṭṭhiṃ ajjhositā, bhavadiṭṭhiyā te paṭiviruddhā.

There are these two views, monks: *bhavadiṭṭhi* and *vibhavadiṭṭhi*. Whichever
recluses or brahmins are stuck to *bhavadiṭṭhi*, accept *bhavadiṭṭhi*,
grasp on to *bhavadiṭṭhi*, they are opposed to *vibhavadiṭṭhi*. Whichever
recluses or brahmins are stuck to *vibhavadiṭṭhi*, accept *vibhavadiṭṭhi*,
grasp on to *vibhavadiṭṭhi*, they are opposed to *bhavadiṭṭhi*.

However, while the bhava/abhava opposition might resemble the bhava/vibhava
opposition, I suspect that they are not synonymous. I supect that whereas
the a- of abhava is a negation, the vi- of vibhava has a different kind of
'negative' value and sense, related to its radical sense, which sensse
informs also the 'positive' meanings of the 'same word' (if we may really
call it that).

On the other hand, with all due respects to Lance, when I read Lance's
recent post of his translation of Nidd I, II 278:

rūpe vibhūte na phusanti phassāti. rūpe vibhūte vibhāvite atikkante
samatikkante vītivatte pañca phassā na phusanti — cakkhusamphasso,
sotasamphasso, ghānasamphasso, jivhāsamphasso, kāyasamphassoti — rūpe
vibhūte na phusanti phassā.

as

*When materiality is transcended, contacts do not function*: when
materiality has been transcended, revealed, passed beyond, gone beyond,
surpassed <in the formless attainments> the five kinds of contact do not
function: eye contact, ear contact, nose contact, tongue contact, bodily
contact. So when materiality is transcended, contacts do not function.

and so, also, when Chanida similarly translated: ‘when form is transcended,
contacts do not contact’, I intuitively could not agree with taking the
sense of 'rūpe vibhūte' as 'materiality has been transcended'. Of course,
it's not that I don't like the idea of materiality being transcended: that
sounds wonderful to me, no problem. Nor is it that I would like 'vibhūta'
to mean that materiality itself is somehow 'destroyed' or made to 'cease to
exist'. That, too, might possibly be a good thing ... but obviously, my
concern is somewhat deeper than a matter of personal taste or preference.

I just don't think 'transcended' is appropriate or right for 'vibhūta' in
this kind of context (and of course I'm ultimately pointing back to AN 11.9
and the nexus of connections this has not only with the other 'samādhi
suttas' in question, but various other fundamental concepts in the doctrine
of the Nikāyas, especially as clustered around the central concept and role
of 'phassa').

I feel that the idea of 'transcending' is certainly right, here, but I also
feel that if 'vibhūta' is translated as 'transcended' something important
will be lost. I think it's important to retain the distinction between
'vibhūta' (and certain other derivations from vi-bhū) and various other
terms; including 'samatikkama', which has a very precise and significant
role in the descriptions of the (arūpa) jhānas, and which I would rather
translate as 'having transcended'.

I'll mention only two reasons for this: the first is
linguistic/etymological but also, in virtue of that,
doctrinal/philosophical; the second is more phenomenological.

(1) The English 'transcend' derives of course from Latin trāns, 'across,
through, beyond' + scandere, 'to climb'. Thus, 'sur-mount' is in fact
virtually a translation of 'trans-cend'. Yet, the term 'transcend' has a
'philosophical' relevance that is valid and important here; 'surmount', in
English, has a different connotation, which is still relevant, but not
quite as appropriate, phenomenologically. There is a fairly precise Pāli
correlate for the literal sense of 'transcend': 'atikkamati': ati, 'over,
above' + kamati, 'step, walk, go, progress' (cf. Cone 2001). But the more
typical Pāli term, which I think has the technical sense of 'transcending'
in the meditative context, is 'samatikkamati' (andthe gerund
'samatikkama'), where I take the prefix 'sam' to function as an intensifier
with the sense 'thoroughly, fully, perfectly'. This close semantic match
between 'transcend' and 'samatikkamati' may not be a mere fortunate
coincidence. It may derive from and reflect a certain 'naturalness' in the
way that we are forced to use language metaphorically in order to indicate
certain ideas or experiences.

In contrast, etymologically and, even more importantly, phenomenologically,
'vi-bhūta' suggests something quite distinct and quite distinctly different
from 'samatikkamma'. I suggested before that a-bhava may not be a synonym
of vi-bhava when the latter is used negatively. It's interesting to note
that vi-bhūta is not usually taken as a synonym of a-bhūta, 'untrue, false'
(the idea being that something doesn't exist, is not the case). And
although 'abhūta' is grammatically (and, very strictly speaking,
semantically) the negation of 'bhūta', they are not used as simple
contraries. More on this later.

(2) The phenomenological implications: I feel that there may well be a
deeper phenomenological lesson to be learnt from the use of the term
vibhūta in contexts such as 'rūpe vibhūte na phusanti phassāti' and '
pathaviyaṃ pathavisaññā vibhūtā hoti'; but not only here, where the term
actually occurs, but also in many other suttas, where the same idea may be
indicated, although not with this particular word. Just one of a number of
good examples is the very important passage in SN 35.117 (S IV 98) which
begins:

tasmātiha, bhikkhave, se āyatane veditabbe yattha cakkhu ca nirujjhati,
rūpasaññā ca virajjati...

Therefore, monks, that sphere/base should be know, where the eye ceases
[nirujjhati], and the perception of material form virajjati...

And so also for the other five sense faculties and their object-perceptions.

I think Ven. Ñāṇananda (who, like Ven. Bodhi, follows the versions of Ee
and Se; Be has 'nirujjhati' throughout), in his comments on this passage
(p. 450), has grasped the right idea, here, and I'll come back to this in a
moment.

Actually, I think that there is no a significant distinction between the
phenomenological sense of the expression 'rūpe vibhūte' and 'pathaviyaṃ
pathavisaññā vibhūtā hoti': I don't think that the former is necessarily
referring to 'real external materiality' while the second is referring to
the 'mere inner mental perception of materiality', and that there is a
distinction to be made between vibhūta as applied to 'real matter' and
vibhūta as applied to a 'mental act', i.e., 'perception'. Rather, 'rūpe
vibhūte' may be just a poetic shorthand indicating 'rūpa' as a phenomenon
of perception, a perceptual phenomenon. The phenomenological point is vital
because it's about what we actually experience, whether in the 'ordinary'
state of mind or in any 'meditative' states of mind. Can anyone say that
they've encountered 'real, raw materiality' outside of their consciousness?
No, of course not: 'raw materiality' is a particular kind and class of
phenomena.

So, I think it's quite right to understand the meaning of 'rūpe vibhūte'
and 'pathaviyaṃ pathavisaññā vibhūtā hoti' under the concept of
'transcending'; but I think that the term itself may be telling us
something more, something more specific and phenomenologically relevant;
something that might be useful to us in our own analyses of, reflections
upon, our experiences and states, whether non-meditative or meditative.

I think this sense must be connected also to those 'negative' senses of
'vi-bhū' that we find in some suttas as in the examples previously cited,
e.g.: the very clear example in DN 1 (D I 34): santi, bhikkhave, eke
samaṇabrāhmaṇā ucchedavādā sato sattassa ucchedaṃ vināsaṃ vibhavaṃ
paññapenti sattahi vatthūhi; the future tense form *vibhavissati* in SN
22.55 (at S III 56*)*:*

*rūpaṃ vibhavissatīti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. vedanā... saññā... saṅkhārā...
viññāṇaṃ vibhavissatīti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti.

He knows as it really is that 'form vibhavissati', ... that 'feeling..',
'perception...', 'constitutions...', ... '(sensory) consciousness
vibhavissati'.

It's important to note that this passage follows immediately in a sequence
in which the khandhas are described as anicca, dukkha, anattā, saṅkhata.
Then follows:

so rūpassa vibhavā, vedanāya vibhavā, saññā vibhavā, saṅkhārānaṃ vibhavā,
viññāṇassa vibhavā, evaṃ kho, bhikkhu, ‘no cassaṃ, no ca me siyā,
nābhavissa, na me bhavissatī’ti — evaṃ adhimuccamāno bhikkhu chindeyya
orambhāgiyāni saṃyojanānī ti.

Due to the vibhava of material form, the vibhava of feeling, the
vibhava ofperception, the vibhava of constitutions, and the vibhava of
consciousness,
that monk, resolving thus, 'It might not be, it might not be for me, it
will not be, it will not be for me', that monk can cut off the lower
fetters.

I have to wind this up, so let me end by coming back to Ven. Ñāṇananda's
comment on the sense of virajjati in SN 35.117 (S IV 98):

tasmātiha, bhikkhave, se āyatane veditabbe yattha cakkhu ca nirujjhati,
rūpasaññā ca virajjati...

Therefore, monks, that sphere/base should be know, where the eye ceases
[nirujjhati], and the perception of material form virajjati...

He writes

"There is some peculiarity in the very wording of the passage, when it
says, for instance, that the eye ceases, *cakkhuñca nirujjhati *and
perceptions of form fade away, *rūpasaññā ca virajjati*. As we once pointed
out, the word *virāga*, usually rendered by ‘detachment,’ has a nuance
equivalent to ‘fading away’ or ‘decolouration.’ Here that nuance is clearly
evident. When the eye ceases, perceptions of forms fade away." (p. 450)
His use of the term 'de-colouration' is very apt: although here 'dis-' in
'dis-colouration' would be etymologically closer to vi- in 'vi-rāga' and
'vi-rajjati', in English, of course, 'discolouration' suggests a change of
colour, not a loss of colour. So, 'de-colouration' is much better for
suggesting the sense of a 'loss of rāga'; where 'rāga' (from rañj) means,
most literally, 'the act of colouring or dyeing; colour; hue, tint, dye,
(especially) red colour, redness' (MW, cf. also Whitney, *Roots*, 'raj',
'rañj', 'colour'). It seems to me that this might give us a deep hint into
a possible sense (or at least connotation) for the 'negative' uses of
vi-bhū, as in, e.g., vi-bhūta and vi-bhava in certain very precise early
Buddhist context. Namely, a sense of 'de-being', 'de-becoming'. If we
take 'virajjati' in the above passage as 'fading away' in the sense of
'de-colouring', hence the 'virāga' of 'rūpa-saññā', 'sadda-saññā', etc. may
parallel in sense (and phenomenology) the vibhūta of the same; a certain
'bleaching of being', which is not just a fading of affect (desire,
attachment, etc.), but a fading of the actual intentional of the
object/phenomenon that can lead to the actual disappearance of the
perception of the phenomenon. This would be a 'transcending' that not
merely in metaphorical sense, but an actual phenomenological sense. Is
that really possible and plausible? From a phenomenological perspective, I
believe it is, and I also think that the suttas already contain and
elegantly explain the principle for the 'de-being' of experience.

With metta,
Khristos

On 17 October 2012 01:55, Lennart Lopin <novalis78@... <mailto:novalis78%40gmail.com> > wrote:

> **
>
>
> Dear Jim, Lance
>
>
> > As I'll be leaving in a few days and be offline for 3 weeks, I don't have
> > much time left for this interesting descussion on the *real* meaning of
> > "vībhūtā" in AN 11.10. However, I'd like to add a few observations from
> my
> > own investigation of the meaning so far which may be of interest to some.
> > Keep in mind that in addition to the Tipiṭaka I also have a high regard
> for
> > the commentaries as well as the Pali grammar tradition...
> >
> > A look at the commentary to AN 11.10 with the gloss "pākaṭā" for
> "vibhūtā"
> > will lead one to Vism III.109-114 with its Mahāṭīkā explanation of
> > "vibhūtā"
> > as follows:
> >
> > " Vibhūtāti vipulārammaṇatāya supākaṭā, vaḍḍhitanimittatāya
> > appamāṇārammaṇabhāvena paribyattāti attho."
> >
> > "paribyattā" is obviously a synonym of "pākaṭā".
> >
> > Now in the Padamālā of the Saddanīti one will find much on the root "bhū"
> > and probably every word derived from it with explanations of their
> > meanings. Of particular interest is the explanation of "vibhavo" in the
> > five meanings: *dhanaṃ*, nibbānaṃ, sampatti, vināso, and ucchedadiṭṭhi.
>
> > The
> > meaning of "vibhavo" that comes closest to the Mahāṭīkā explanation of
> > "vibhūtā" is "dhanaṃ". Here is the Padamālā explanation:
> >
> > * dhanaṃ *pana bhavanti vaḍḍhanti vuddhiṃ viruuḷhiṃ vepullaṃ āpajjanti
>
> > sattā
> > etenāti vibhavo.``asītiko.tivibhavassa brāhmaṇassa putto hutvaa
> > nibbattī''ti
> > idametassatthassa sādhakaṃ vacanaṃ. idaṃ pana pariyāyavacanaṃ --
> >
> > dhanaṃ saṃ vibhavo dabbaṃ, saapateyyaṃ pariggaho.
> > oḍḍaṃ bhaṇḍaṃ sakaṃ attho, iccete dhanavācakā..
> >
> > Not sure if any of this helps. "vibhūṭā" in the sense of "abundantly
> > increased" ?? The Vism passage explains the difference between vibhūtā
> and
> > avibhūtā.
> >
> > Best wishes,
> >
> > Jim
> >
>
> What I found quite fascinating is that Karl Eugen Neumann's singular
> interpretation of "vibhavataṇhā" as "Wohlseinsdurst" (thirst for
> well-being) seems to be reflected in the passage you quote above (glossing
> vibhavo with dhana) - and adds to what Lance has mentioned about Sanskrit
> sources prior to Pali. I am pretty sure Neumann was aware of the passage
> Jim quoted, though he does not mention it (he is known to have rejected the
> commentaries in his translation work having a very low opinion of
> Buddhaghosa. He usually tried to translate based on parallel passages
> (context) or his knowledge of other old Sanskrit parallels). In his notes
> on a passage in the DN 33 on *bhava *and *abhava *he writes:
>
> *Bei uns oben sind Dasein und Nichtsein die Grenzpunkte jeder möglichen
> > Betrachtung: bhavo und vibhavo, oder bhavo und abhavo, als Antithese.
> Wohl
> > davon zu unterscheiden ist der andere vibhavo, bei der Darstellung des
> > dreifachen Durstes, in der gesteigerten Triade kāmataṇhā bhavataṇhā
> > vibhavataṇhā: Geschlechtsdurst, Daseinsdurst, Wohlseinsdurst. Da
> > ist vi nicht die Präposition der Trennung sondern die der Verstärkung.*
>
> my rough translation:
>
> "In reference to our passage above Being and Non-Being are the boundaries
> > of any possible perception: bhavo and vibhavo or bhavo and abhavo as
> > anti-thesis. Very clearly to be differentiated has to be the other
> vibhavo,
> > when it appears in the the presentation of the threefold thirst, where it
> > appears in a climactical triad as kamatanha, bhavatanha, vibhavatanha:
> > sensual thirst, thirst for existence, thirst for being well. The "vi-" is
> > not a preposition of separation but a preposition of
> increase/strengthening.
>
> Neumann goes on to say that:
>
> "This usage of a preposition with opposing meanings is something which can
> be found quite often in Indian languages and is well known; it has
> developed into two opposite directions, similarly to our (German) prefix
> "ver-", for instance in "vermoegen, vergnuegen" vs. "verderben, vergessen"
> etc and in a double meaning "versehen, versprechen", etc. Vibhavo as
> Development, Power, Regency, Fullness, Abundance, Happiness is the more
> basic idea (see footnote 697) while the meaning of vibhavo = abhavo is
> relatively rare and usually appears as an anti-thesis. This double
> relationship was also known to Oldenburg in his first edition of "Buddha"
> but he later changed his mind, saying that he was mistaken...and thus
> shortens the triad into an anti-thesis.
>
> > *Diese je nachdem entgegengesetzte Geltung ein und derselben Präposition
> > ist im indischen Sprachgebrauch häufig anzutreffen, allbekannt; sie hat
> > analog wie bei unserem ver- nach einander gegenüberstehenden Seiten sich
> > entwickelt, vergl. vermögen, vergnügen – verderben, vergessen, und in
> > doppelter Bedeutung: versehn, versprechen u.a.m. Vibhavo als Entfaltung,
> > Macht, Herrschaft, Fülle, Glückseligkeit, gibt die überaus oft
> vorkommende
> > gewöhnliche Vorstellung, siehe die Belege in der Anm. 697<
> http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Gotamo+Buddho/Die+Reden+Gotamo+Buddhos/Aus+der+L%C3%A4ngeren+Sammlung/Anmerkungen
> >,
> > während der Gegensinn dazu, vibhavo = abhavo, recht selten erscheint, nur
> > wie in der Antithese bei uns oben. Dieses doppelte Verhältnis hatte
> > OLDENBERG einst erkannt, S. 130 der 1. Aufl. seines »Buddha«, ist aber
> > davon abgekommen und redet nun immer, 6. Aufl., S. 147, durch ein
> > Mißverständnis verleitet, vom gesteigerten vibhavo als von einer
> > Vergänglichkeit, nennt die vibhavataṇhā den »Vergänglichkeitsdurst«, ohne
> > den genetisch bedingten Unterschied noch zu merken, verkürzt also
> beliebig
> > den Begriff in der Triade auf den in der Antithese. Eine mehr und mehr
> > vertiefte Übung und Vertrautheit mit der Ausdrucksweise der älteren, und
> > nicht nur buddhistischen, Texte wird aber bald das schlecht angebrachte
> > einseitige Zustutzen als eine gewaltsame Beschränkung erkennen, die dem
> > indischen Sprachcharakter, wie schon gesagt, so fremd wie dem deutschen
> ist.
> > Der Daseinsdurst, bhavataṇhā, und seine weitere Entwicklung zum
> > Wohlseinsdurst, vibhavataṇhā, ein Dürsten, das eben auch noch die
> höchsten
> > himmlischen Seligkeiten durchzieht,... (Source: *
> >
> http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Gotamo+Buddho/Die+Reden+Gotamo+Buddhos/Aus+der+L%C3%A4ngeren+Sammlung/Anmerkungen
> > )
>
> His other comment on the same topic, also found in his DN translation runs
> like this:
>
> The Thirst for Well-being, the thirst to be well, vibhavatanha, was wrongly
> > identified as "desire for impermanence" (Oldenberg in his comments to
> > "Buddha" 5th ed.) or even worse "desire for (eternal) death" in Pischel's
> > "Leben und Lehre des Buddha". The 44th discourse of the MN [see Neumann's
> > comment there copied below] amkes this exegetical mis-understanding
> > apparent. *Vibhavo = vibhūti*, that is Well-being, wealth and abundance
> > is here the only possible most often used concept, as by the way, can
> also
> > verified from the Jatakam (I p. 145, II p. 283 etc) as mahavibhavo,
> > bahuvibhavo, etc. and also much earlier in the early ruti, from which I,
> to
> > bring just one example, may quote the Prasnopanisat V 4: "* sa somaloke
> > vibhūtim anubhūya punar āvartate*." The Wellbeing desire, vibhavatanha is
> > the increased desire to be, bhavatanha: the sensual pleasure desire is
> the
> > even more basic fundamental desire on which these two are based. This
> view,
> > that from the senusal desire the whole existence with all its worlds and
> > gods have come to be, was already an idea that the sages of ancient times
> > proclaimed in their verses of the Rksamhita, X1294:kāmas tad agre
> > samavartatādhi etc. with poetic emphasis but without any further
> > deductions or just those of cosmological nature. This ancient famous
> verse
> > was probably also known to Gotamo, probably in his youth when during a
> > presentation of vedic priests and their students of which there many
> living
> > in Kapilavatthu (see DN 3).
>
> *697<
> http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Gotamo+Buddho/Die+Reden+Gotamo+Buddhos/Aus+der+L%C3%A4ngeren+Sammlung/2.+Teil.+Gro%C3%9Fes+Buch/22.+Rede.+Die+Pfeiler+der+Einsicht#N8952
> >
> Der
> > Wohlseinstrieb, Durst nach Wohlsein, vibhavataṇhā, ist unzugehörig, bez.
> > auf Grundlage des hier wie so oft in die Irre schweifenden Kommentars von
> > OLDENBERG, Buddha, 5. Aufl. S. 150, als »Vergänglichkeitsdurst«, von
> > PISCHEL, Leben und Lehre des Buddha S. 28, gar als »Durst nach (ewigem)
> > Tode« verkannt worden: die [749]<
> http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/L/Buddhos+Bd.+2> 44.
> > Rede der Mittleren Sammlung, S. 332, nebst Anm. 35<
> http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Gotamo+Buddho/Die+Reden+Gotamo+Buddhos/Aus+der+L%C3%A4ngeren+Sammlung/Anmerkungen
> >,
> > deckt das exegetische Mißverständnis auf. Vibhavo = vibhūti,d.i.
> > Wohlsein, Reichtum, Machtfülle, ist hier der einzig mögliche
> > sprachgebräuchliche Begriff, wie er sich übrigens auch aus dem Jātakam
> gut
> > nachweisen läßt, I p. 145, II p. 283 etc., als mahāvibhavo, bahuvibhavo,
> usw.;
> > und ebenso reichlich schon in der frühen ruti, aus der ich, nur
> > beispielsweise, Prasnopaniṣat V 4 anführe: sa somaloke vibhūtim anubhūya
> > punar āvartate. Der Wohlseinstrieb, vibhavataṇhā, ist der gesteigerte
> > Daseinstrieb, bhavataṇhā: der Geschlechtstrieb, kāmataṇhā, ist das
> > Urphänomen dazu. Diese Ansicht, daß nämlich aus dem Geschlechtstrieb das
> > ganze Dasein mit allen Welten und Göttern hervorgesprossen sei, hatte
> schon
> > ein Seher der Vorzeit in einem Spruche der Ṛksaṃhitā verkündet, X 1294:
> kāmas
> > tad agre samavartatādhi usw., mit tiefer dichterischer Ergriffenheit,
> > natürlich ohne weitere Schlüsse zu ziehn, oder doch nur solche
> > kosmogonischer Art. Der Spruch ist altberühmt und war gewiß auch von
> Gotamo
> > gehört worden, wahrscheinlich schon in seiner Jugend, beim Vortrag
> > vedischer Haus- und Hofpriester und ihrer Schüler, an denen es in
> > Kapilavatthu nicht gefehlt hat. Vergl. die 3. Rede S. 60. – Die vorher
> > gekennzeichnete Gnügensgier, der Gnügensreiz, nandirāgo, wird in einem
> > zugehörigen Gleichnisse des Saṃyuttakanikāyo (vol. IV p. 173/4) einem
> > verkappten Mörder verglichen, der mit gezücktem Dolche nachschleicht: so
> > ist osahagatā,overbunden, zu verstehn, als eine solche Begleitung. Cf.
> > Bruchst. d.R.v. 664 A.i.f.*
>
> Hellmuth Hecker has a discussion on Neumann's choice and his own analysis
> on the subject. Unfortunately I do not have a copy of his book "Die Lehre
> des Buddha und Karl Eugen Neumann" (Google Books Snipet link:
> here<
> http://books.google.com/books?id=73RtAAAAIAAJ <http://books.google.com/books?id=73RtAAAAIAAJ&q=hecker+neumann+%22nicht+stichhaltig%22&dq=hecker+neumann+%22nicht+stichhaltig%22&source=bl&ots=fJ7jAcadVw&sig=Rojyq5J2063YTc0XI9wz-vv2plE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=1G19UM6KDozo8QT184GABg&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA> &q=hecker+neumann+%22nicht+stichhaltig%22&dq=hecker+neumann+%22nicht+stichhaltig%22&source=bl&ots=fJ7jAcadVw&sig=Rojyq5J2063YTc0XI9wz-vv2plE&hl=en&sa=X&ei=1G19UM6KDozo8QT184GABg&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAA
> >
> )
>
> Interestingly enough, in his comment on MN 44, Neumann mentions that the
> "vibhavo" can also "equally often" appear in the negative sense and in that
> case resemble the abhava as in "bhavabhava":
>
> [image: Inline image 1]
>
> mettāya,
>
> Lennart
>
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>
>
>

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