RE: vibhuta in AN 11.10

Dear Khristos,



Thank you for your long comment on my previous email about the meaning of vibhūta in AN 11.10. Let me reply in two parts, addressing two points you bring up  in your email.

First, you write:



This leads me to the following assertion: there is also a third kind of
consideration that, ideally, can and should be taken into account, once we
have examined, as closely and thoroughly as possible, the kinds of
considerations (1) and (2). This third kind is what I would call (3) a *
phenomenological* (or more broadly, an *experiential*) consideration of the
possible and probable sense of a term/concept in its given instances and
contexts. This does not require that we must personally have experienced
the state of consciousness in question (although that is certainly the
ideal scenario); but that the understanding of such a state can be
extrapolated in a phenomenologically (or experientially) consistent way
from the basis of what is most essentially and evidently true within what
we *do* know about those states of consciousness that we certainly
*have*experienced, especially through our engagement with relevant
kinds of practice.



I agree partly with your proposal that phenomenological (or experiential) consideration should be given to a term or concept in order to determine its likely meaning, but I also see a certain defect in this method if taken as self-sufficient, without examination of the term’s etymology and contextual usages. The problem is that the experience of different subjects (that is, practitioners) can lead to contrary conclusions. In fact, this problem can even arise when one takes account of linguistic and contextual factors.

An example of current interest is the question whether it is possible to attain the first stage of awakening (sotāpatti) purely on the basis of insight without prior attainment of the jhānas. There are contemporary meditation teachers who assert, apparently on the basis of personal experience and related considerations, that it is possible; others say that it is not possible. This example may not be perfect, because one might argue that the person who has attained sotāpatti after attaining the jhānas has no basis for repudiating the claim that sotāpatti can be attained without prior attainment of the jhānas; whereas the “bare insight” practitioner can claim an experiential basis for asserting that sotāpatti can be attained without the jhānas. To resolve their differences, they would eventually have to turn to the texts, and at that point a disagreement could still arise over which texts should be considered pivotal for resolving their difference.

Jhāna-practitioners often argue that if we rely solely on the Nikāyas, it is clear that jhāna, being the substance of sammā samādhi in the noble eightfold path, is necessary for attaining any fruition. Bare insight-practitioners usually regard the Visuddhimagga and commentaries as authoritative, and on this basis affirm the possibility of proceeding on the basis of “bare insight” without prior attainment of the jhānas.



I have read of another disagreement between highly accomplished meditators: over the question whether (for the jhāna-attainer) insight is to be practiced within the jhāna or after emerging from the jhāna. Both claim to base their positions on personal experience, but they also seek textual support. Some practitioners who regard the Nikāyas as their sole authority—and regard the commentaries as departing from the original intent of the text—contend that insight can be practiced within the jhāna itself; they often appeal for support to such suttas as MN 64 and MN 52, in both of which it seems that insight is being developed while the meditator is in jhāna. Those who contend that the meditator must emerge from jhāna in order to develop insight appeal to the commentaries and Vism, which maintain that the meditator must emerge from jhāna in order to develop insight.



Second, you ask me to draw out the implications of the refrains in the “samādhi suttas” of AN Tens and Elevens.


On this basis, I would like to ask of you your opinion regarding the
following question. Taking into account AN 10.7 *Sāriputtasuttaṃ*, 10.8 *
Jhānasuttaṃ*, 11.7 *Saññāsuttaṃ*, 11.8 *Manasikārasuttaṃ*, and 11.9 (or
11.10) *Saddhasuttaṃ*, what do you make of the implications of their
respective refrains:

AN 10.6: *saññī ca pana assā ti*
AN 10.7: *saññī ca pana ahosin ti*
AN 11.7: *saññī ca pana assā ti*
AN 11.8: *manasi ca pana kareyyā ti*
AN 11.9 (or 11.10): *jhāyati ca pana*

Of course, I ask this question with reference to the *context *of each of
these five *suttāni*, the context being profoundly comprehensive: ranging,
in AN 10.6-7, from the perception of ‘earth’ to the perception of ‘neither
this world nor the next’, with AN 11.7-9 (or 10) adding “what is seen,
heard, sensed, cognised, attained, sought, traversed in thought by the mind”
* *(*yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ
manasā*) to the list of what is not perceived, not attended to in mind, and
not meditated upon, respectively.

Given that these *sutta*s assert, on the one hand, the ‘disappearance’ or
‘cessation’ of this very broad spectrum of ‘objects of perception’, yet, on
the other hand, they assert that, even after such ‘disappearance’ or
‘cessation’ has been effected, there still remains a certain *
consciousness-of* (one is still *percipient* (AN 10.6-7 and AN 11.87); one
still *attends in mind* (AN 11.8), one still *meditates* (AN 11.9 (or
11.10)), what, in your understanding, does this imply about the nature of
such a consciousness?

All except AN 10.7 tell us that, in such a meditative state, what we might
call the ‘object’ of consciousness is as follows:

‘This is peaceful, this is the extreme: this calming of all formations,
forsaking of all attachments, extinction of craving, absence of desire,
cessation, *Nibbāna*.’

*
*

*‘etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho
sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānan’ti*.



It seems to me that these texts are indicating two things: first, that this attainment is not to be identified with saññāvedayita-nirodha, in which all saññā (and presumably manasikāra) would be absent; and second, that the “object” or “domain” of this special samādhi is nibbāna, which is apprehended by a direct meditative experience. The commentary to AN 10.6 says that the formula indicates this to be an attainment with thought (savitakkasamāpatti), but I doubt that the meditator would need to mentally verbalize this formula (in full or in part) within the samādhi. Perhaps the formula could be seen as expressing the line of reflection the meditator uses to enter this samādhi and the line of reflection that arises after emerging from this state. I do not see the fact that the meditator is “percipient” (saññī) to require that he also be engaged in vitakka.



The commentary to AN 10.6 identifies this samādhi with phalasamāpatti (sabbampetaṃ phalasamāpattisamādhiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ). To my knowledge the term phalasamāpatti does not occur in the old Nikāyas, but passages like this provide a basis for it. It’s interesting that the suttas speaks simply about a bhikkhu and do not identify this bhikkhu with the standard arahant formula. These passages can thus serve as canonical support for the commentarial thesis that each of the four noble ones has access to the fruition-attainment that corresponds to his or her level of realization. The possible exception to this is AN 11.9, in which the gods pay homage to the meditator and declare him to be purisuttama, “a supreme person,” an expression that I suppose would be used only with reference to an arahant.





AN 10.7 provides a most interesting and informative variation upon this
theme:
‘Cessation of becoming is Nibbāna, cessation of becoming is Nibbāna’ – one
perception arose in me, friend, another perception ceased. Just as,
friend, when a woodchip fire is burning, one flame arises, another flame
ceases; just so, friend, ‘Cessation of becoming is Nibbāna, cessation of
becoming is Nibbāna’ – one perception arose, another perception ceased. And
so at that time, friend, I was percipient of ‘Cessation of becoming is
Nibbāna, cessation of becoming is Nibbāna’.

*“bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan”ti kho me, āvuso, aññāva
saññā uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. seyyathāpi, āvuso, sakalikaggissa
jhāyamānassa aññāva acci uppajjati aññāva acci nirujjhati; evamevaṃ kho,
āvuso, ‘bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti aññāva saññā
uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. ‘bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti saññī ca
panāhaṃ, āvuso, tasmiṃ samaye ahosin”ti.*



This is the sutta in this set that I have found most problematic. I would interpret it to mean that Sāriputta was percipient that “cessation of becoming is Nibbāna” before entering the attainment and immediately after emerging from it. Throughout the attainment he would have been percipient of nibbāna but without relying on the verbal formula. This is just a conjecture.



With metta,

Bhikkhu Bodhi





From: palistudy@yahoogroups.com [mailto:palistudy@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Khristos Nizamis
Sent: Sunday, October 14, 2012 3:25 AM
To: palistudy@yahoogroups.com
Subject: Re: [palistudy] vibhuta in AN 11.10



  

Venerable Bodhi,

I agree with your argument, evidence, and conclusion concerning the most
plausible sense of the term *vibhūta* in the context of AN 11.10. I went
through a virtually identical procedure about a year ago concerning this *
sutta* and this particular term (although I made use of the search function
of Digital Pāli Reader, which I personally found to be superior to, and
more efficient than, that of the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana Tipiṭaka: e.g., one can
find all derivative forms within a selected range of texts by utilising
just the prefix + stem *vibhūt*-, which, as far as I am aware, at least,
cannot be done with CST).

Moreover, I agree with you that in trying to comprehend the sense or
meaning of Pāli terms in actual contexts, one must give attention not only
(1) to etymological, lexical, grammatical, and syntactical considerations,
but also (2) to parallel and cognate discursive or contextual
considerations (as you have done, for example, by comparing not the word
itself but the parallel or cognate contextual sense of AN 11.7 and 11.8,
and also, I am sure, of AN 10.7 and 10.8).

This leads me to the following assertion: there is also a third kind of
consideration that, ideally, can and should be taken into account, once we
have examined, as closely and thoroughly as possible, the kinds of
considerations (1) and (2). This third kind is what I would call (3) a *
phenomenological* (or more broadly, an *experiential*) consideration of the
possible and probable sense of a term/concept in its given instances and
contexts. This does not require that we must personally have experienced
the state of consciousness in question (although that is certainly the
ideal scenario); but that the understanding of such a state can be
extrapolated in a phenomenologically (or experientially) consistent way
from the basis of what is most essentially and evidently true within what
we *do* know about those states of consciousness that we certainly
*have*experienced, especially through our engagement with relevant
kinds of
practice.

On this basis, I would like to ask of you your opinion regarding the
following question. Taking into account AN 10.7 *Sāriputtasuttaṃ*, 10.8 *
Jhānasuttaṃ*, 11.7 *Saññāsuttaṃ*, 11.8 *Manasikārasuttaṃ*, and 11.9 (or
11.10) *Saddhasuttaṃ*, what do you make of the implications of their
respective refrains:

AN 10.6: *saññī ca pana assā ti*

AN 10.7: *saññī ca pana ahosin ti*

AN 11.7: *saññī ca pana assā ti*

AN 11.8: *manasi ca pana kareyyā ti*

AN 11.9 (or 11.10): *jhāyati ca pana*

Of course, I ask this question with reference to the *context *of each of
these five *suttāni*, the context being profoundly comprehensive: ranging,
in AN 10.6-7, from the perception of ‘earth’ to the perception of ‘neither
this world nor the next’, with AN 11.7-9 (or 10) adding “what is seen,
heard, sensed, cognised, attained, sought, traversed in thought by the mind”
* *(*yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ
manasā*) to the list of what is not perceived, not attended to in mind, and
not meditated upon, respectively.

Given that these *sutta*s assert, on the one hand, the ‘disappearance’ or
‘cessation’ of this very broad spectrum of ‘objects of perception’, yet, on
the other hand, they assert that, even after such ‘disappearance’ or
‘cessation’ has been effected, there still remains a certain *
consciousness-of* (one is still *percipient* (AN 10.6-7 and AN 11.87); one
still *attends in mind* (AN 11.8), one still *meditates* (AN 11.9 (or
11.10)), what, in your understanding, does this imply about the nature of
such a consciousness?

All except AN 10.7 tell us that, in such a meditative state, what we might
call the ‘object’ of consciousness is as follows:

‘This is peaceful, this is the extreme: this calming of all formations,
forsaking of all attachments, extinction of craving, absence of desire,
cessation, *Nibbāna*.’

*
*

*‘etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho
sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānan’ti*.

AN 10.7 provides a most interesting and informative variation upon this
theme:

‘Cessation of becoming is Nibbāna, cessation of becoming is Nibbāna’ – one
perception arose in me, friend, another perception ceased. Just as,
friend, when a woodchip fire is burning, one flame arises, another flame
ceases; just so, friend, ‘Cessation of becoming is Nibbāna, cessation of
becoming is Nibbāna’ – one perception arose, another perception ceased. And
so at that time, friend, I was percipient of ‘Cessation of becoming is
Nibbāna, cessation of becoming is Nibbāna’.

*“bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan”ti kho me, āvuso, aññāva
saññā uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. seyyathāpi, āvuso, sakalikaggissa
jhāyamānassa aññāva acci uppajjati aññāva acci nirujjhati; evamevaṃ kho,
āvuso, ‘bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti aññāva saññā
uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. ‘bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti saññī ca
panāhaṃ, āvuso, tasmiṃ samaye ahosin”ti.*

I look forward to your observations and reflections.

With deep respect and metta,

Khristos Nizamis

For possible convenience, I list the relevant contexts below:

AN 10.6:

“siyā, ānanda, bhikkhuno tathārūpo samādhipaṭilābho yathā neva pathaviyaṃ
pathavisaññī assa, na āpasmiṃ āposaññī assa, na tejasmiṃ tejosaññī assa, na
vāyasmiṃ vāyosaññī assa, na ākāsānañcāyatane ākāsānañcāyatanasaññī assa, na
viññāṇañcāyatane viññāṇañcāyatanasaññī assa, na ākiñcaññāyatane
ākiñcaññāyatanasaññī assa, na nevasaññānāsaññāyatane
nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasaññī assa, na idhaloke idhalokasaññī assa, na
paraloke paralokasaññī assa; saññī ca pana assā”ti. . . .

“idhānanda, bhikkhu evaṃsaññī hoti — ‘etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ
sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho
nibbānan’ti.

AN 10.7:

“siyā, āvuso ānanda, bhikkhuno tathārūpo samādhipaṭilābho yathā neva
pathaviyaṃ pathavisaññī assa ... pe ... na paraloke paralokasaññī assa;
saññī ca pana assā”ti. . . .

“ekamidāhaṃ, āvuso ānanda, samayaṃ idheva sāvatthiyaṃ viharāmi
andhavanasmiṃ. tatthāhaṃ tathārūpaṃ samādhiṃ samāpajjiṃ yathā neva
pathaviyaṃ pathavisaññī ahosiṃ, na āpasmiṃ āposaññī ahosiṃ, na tejasmiṃ
tejosaññī ahosiṃ, na vāyasmiṃ vāyosaññī ahosiṃ, na ākāsānañcāyatane
ākāsānañcāyatanasaññī ahosiṃ, na viññāṇañcāyatane viññāṇañcāyatanasaññī
ahosiṃ, na ākiñcaññāyatane ākiñcaññāyatanasaññī ahosiṃ, na
nevasaññānāsaññāyatane nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasaññī ahosiṃ, na idhaloke
idhalokasaññī ahosiṃ, na paraloke paralokasaññī ahosiṃ; saññī ca pana
ahosin”ti. . . .

“bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan”ti kho me, āvuso, aññāva saññā
uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. seyyathāpi, āvuso, sakalikaggissa
jhāyamānassa aññāva acci uppajjati aññāva acci nirujjhati; evamevaṃ kho,
āvuso, ‘bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti aññāva saññā
uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. ‘bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti saññī ca
panāhaṃ, āvuso, tasmiṃ samaye ahosin”ti.

AN 11.7

“evaṃ kho, ānanda, siyā bhikkhuno tathārūpo samādhipaṭilābho yathā neva
pathaviyaṃ pathavisaññī assa, na āpasmiṃ āposaññī assa, na tejasmiṃ
tejosaññī assa, na vāyasmiṃ vāyosaññī assa, na ākāsānañcāyatane
ākāsānañcāyatanasaññī assa, na viññāṇañcāyatane viññāṇañcāyatanasaññī
T.5.345 assa, na ākiñcaññāyatane ākiñcaññāyatanasaññī assa, na
nevasaññānāsaññāyatane nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasaññī assa, na idhaloke
idhalokasaññī assa, na paraloke paralokasaññī assa, yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ
mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā, tatrāpi na saññī
assa, saññī ca pana assā”ti. . . .

“idha, āvuso ānanda, bhikkhu evaṃsaññī hoti — ‘etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ,
yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo
nirodho nibbānan’ti.

AN 11.8:

“siyā, ānanda, bhikkhuno tathārūpo samādhipaṭilābho yathā na cakkhuṃ manasi
kareyya, na rūpaṃ manasi kareyya, na sotaṃ manasi kareyya, na saddaṃ manasi
kareyya, na ghānaṃ manasi kareyya, na gandhaṃ manasi kareyya, na jivhaṃ
manasi kareyya, na rasaṃ manasi kareyya, na kāyaṃ manasi kareyya, na
phoṭṭhabbaṃ manasi kareyya, na pathaviṃ manasi kareyya, na āpaṃ manasi
kareyya, na tejaṃ manasi kareyya, na vāyaṃ manasi kareyya, na
ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ manasi kareyya, na viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ manasi kareyya, na
ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ manasi kareyya, na nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ manasi kareyya,
na idhalokaṃ manasi kareyya, na paralokaṃ manasi kareyya, yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ
sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā, tampi na
manasi kareyya; manasi ca pana kareyyā”ti. . . .

“idhānanda, bhikkhu evaṃ manasi karoti — ‘etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ, yadidaṃ
sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho
nibbānan’ti.

AN 11.9 (or AN 11.10):

“idha, saddha, bhadrassa purisājānīyassa pathaviyaṃ pathavisaññā vibhūtā
hoti, āpasmiṃ āposaññā vibhūtā hoti, tejasmiṃ tejosaññā vibhūtā hoti,
vāyasmiṃ vāyosaññā vibhūtā hoti, ākāsānañcāyatane ākāsānañcāyatanasaññā
vibhūtā hoti, viññāṇañcāyatane viññāṇañcāyatanasaññā vibhūtā hoti,
ākiñcaññāyatane ākiñcaññāyatanasaññā vibhūtā hoti, nevasaññānāsaññāyatane
nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasaññā vibhūtā hoti, idhaloke idhalokasaññā vibhūtā
hoti, paraloke paralokasaññā vibhūtā hoti, yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ
viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā, tatrāpi saññā vibhūtā
hoti. evaṃ jhāyī kho, saddha, bhadro purisājānīyo neva pathaviṃ nissāya
jhāyati ... pe ... yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ
anuvicaritaṃ manasā, tampi nissāya na jhāyati; jhāyati ca pana. . . .

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