Hello Geoff and Nina

The link for the essay i referred to earlier is here:

http://www.ocbs.org/research/SabhaavaN.pdf

> I repeat the text:
>
> Katama.m viparinaamasuñña.m
> jaata.m ruupa.m sabhaavena suñña.m,
> vigata.m ruupa.m viparinatañ c'eva suññañ ca
>

Having checked the Culasunnata Sutta, i see that you are right, the
instrumental is used with sunna to mean just 'empty of' (horses,
elephants, etc...).

Regarding viparinaama, i wonder whether it ever really means change;
as far as i've observed, in philosophical contexts it seems to
always mean disappeared, vanished. Bhikkhu Bodhi comments somewhere
that when referring to a human it often means 'death'.

Change is more like a~n~nathatta, as in the famous three
sankhatalakkhana: uppaado, vayo, .thitassa a~n~nathatta

(see AN 3.47, 48; incidentally, this pair of suttas (really just
fragments) is a good example of what appears to be the splitting of
one original text; merely remove the words '-ti' and 'sattamam' from
the end of AN 3.47, and voila! the two suttas become one, more
meaningful, sutta.)


), and

> therefore. like you, I am inclined to translate it as 'own

nature', or its

> own distinctive nature.

Actually, i just went along with the group's rendering. I doubt if a
single rendering can really capture this phrase, which is certainly
used in different senses in different contexts. The Bhagavad Gita
says that svabhaava is the atman (don't ask me for the reference!),
and as you're aware, Nagarjuna accused the Abhidharmikas (actually
Sarvastivadins and Sautrantikas, apparently), of smuggling a similar
philosophical error into Buddhism through the savabhaavavaada.

> In the Visuddhimagga it is translated by individual essence, but

I feel

> that such translations cause misunderstandings. I do not like

essence.

The bhaava is of course derived from the root 'to be', and essence
comes from a similar root (although i believe that 'essence'
and 'existence' in English are related to the Pali word 'atthi',
Skt 'asti'). So there is some justification, but of course we must
look at the contextual usage, especially in abstruse philosophical
discourse.

> Co. adds: changeability. <changeability by decay and falling

away>. The

> changeability appears of the rupa that is present. This cannot be

said of

> past rupa, it states.
> As I understand, when rupa has fallen away it is empty of

changeability.

This is interesting philosophically, but i wonder whether it can be
derived from the text? It clearly says 'disappeared materiality is
changed and empty' (...c'eva...ca), not that when it is disappeared
it is empty of changeability. Perhaps the com. is drawing out
implications here.

>
> I wrote something before about the characteristics of ruupa that

may be of

> interest:
> <There are four characteristics that are inherent in all rúpas.

These

> characteristics have been classified as different rúpas, the

lakkhana rúpas

> (lakkhana means characteristic), which are the following:
>
> arising or origination (upacaya)
> continuity or development (santati)
> decay or ageing (jaraaa)
> falling away or impermanence (aniccataa)

This is interesting, Nina. As i understood the Theravada Abhidhamma,
they alway spoke of three sub-moments (anukkhana): arising, staying,
passing away. This was distinguished from the Sarvastivada, who
spoke of four : arising, staying, decay (jaraa), disappearance; and
the Sautrantika, who said that there are only two: arising and
ceasing.

The four you list here seem to be similar to the Sarvastivadin
conception; can you supply a reference for this? Or am i getting my
contexts mixed up (since you apply it here to just rupa, not as a
general description of the anukkhanas)?

Of course, the most interesting philosophical question is whether
the Theravadins fell into the same substantialist errors as their
brothers the sarvastivada (who probably invented the
Svabhaavavaada). It's obviously not an easy question to answer. It
seems clear enough that the Sarvastivadins went further than the
Theravadins; they frequently used the word 'dravya' (Pali 'dabba'?),
meaning 'substance' in reference to the svabhava, while i am not
aware of that term in the Theravada. On the other hand, the basic
definition of adhamma in terms of sabhava was shared : 'attano pana
sabhavam dharenti'ti dhamma. The essay i give the link to above
opines that the patisambhidamagga did not fall into substantialist
conceptions in its use of sabhava, but later Theravada did.
Certainly i have seen some statements by modern Theravada abhidhamma
scholars that clearly imply this. Perhaps there is simply not a
uniform conception through the school - which would hardly be an
unusual thing.

Anyway, lunch bell has rung...

in Dhamma

Bhante Sujato