At 12:13:28 AM on Sunday, February 9, 2003, Glen Gordon
wrote:
> Miguel:
>>But /m/ and /n/ are not the same phoneme, [...], I would
>>claim that /m/ is "more nasal" than /n/
> Both /m/ and /n/ are [+nasal] according to standard
> phonetics. Your claim is baseless and irrelevant.
You know, this discussion would be far more informative to
those of us who are trying to follow from the sidelines if
you were actually to respond to the argument. Anyone who
goes back to Miguel's post and fills in the ellipsis can see
that whether it be right or wrong, his claim is neither
baseless nor irrelevant. The appeal to standard phonetics
verges on silliness. That it is useful to treat nasality as
a binary feature is no guarantee that there are not in fact
degrees of nasality, or that there isn't something else
going on to distinguish /n/ from /m/ in this setting. Don't
confuse a theoretical analysis with physical reality.
> Regarding the Miguel's nasalization "hunch":
>>It's incomplete, as I have always said.
> Until it is complete, your theory is meaningless to us.
You might want to bear in mind that *all* scientific
theories are incomplete, and that even the best of them
rarely spring forth fully grown like Athena from the head of
Zeus.
>>Occam's razor was never meant to force us into accepting simple
>>but incorrect theories over complex but correct ones.
> Your theory is incomplete by your own admission. So, it is
> as yet founded only on assumptions and incomplete ideas.
> This violates Occam's Razor (ie: multiplication of
> hypotheses).
It does not. Occam's Razor says that one should not
multiply hypotheses *needlessly*. It is not always
immediately apparent whether particular instances of
multiplication are useful or not. (Note that if your
conclusion actually followed from your premises, Occam's
Razor could be wielded against virtually all new research in
any field.)
> Your view is thus demonstratably contrary to principles of
> logic.
Although it is often so (mis)called, Occam's Razor is not a
principle of logic per se, but rather of epistemology.
[...]
A little less petulance and a little more logical argument
would be far more useful.
Brian M. Scott