Re: vibhuta in AN 11.10

Venerable Bodhi,

thank you, I'm very grateful for your detailed reply. I would very much
like to discuss these points farther. This will take some time, as I can
only work intermittently and slowly on my study of Pāli, early
Buddhadhamma, and phenomenology.  So, may I ask for your patience.

I can't not mention that today I received a copy of *The Numerical
Discourses*, which has been on order since May.  And I can't not take this
opportunity to thank you directly for the sheer extensiveness and richness
of all of your work, which you have shared with all.

Respectfully, gratefully,
with much metta,
Khristos



On 16 October 2012 01:44, Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi <venbodhi@...>wrote:

> **
>
>
> Dear Khristos,
>
> Thank you for your long comment on my previous email about the meaning of
> vibhūta in AN 11.10. Let me reply in two parts, addressing two points you
> bring up in your email.
>
>
> First, you write:
>
> This leads me to the following assertion: there is also a third kind of
> consideration that, ideally, can and should be taken into account, once we
> have examined, as closely and thoroughly as possible, the kinds of
> considerations (1) and (2). This third kind is what I would call (3) a *
> phenomenological* (or more broadly, an *experiential*) consideration of the
>
> possible and probable sense of a term/concept in its given instances and
> contexts. This does not require that we must personally have experienced
> the state of consciousness in question (although that is certainly the
> ideal scenario); but that the understanding of such a state can be
> extrapolated in a phenomenologically (or experientially) consistent way
> from the basis of what is most essentially and evidently true within what
> we *do* know about those states of consciousness that we certainly
> *have*experienced, especially through our engagement with relevant
> kinds of practice.
>
> I agree partly with your proposal that phenomenological (or experiential)
> consideration should be given to a term or concept in order to determine
> its likely meaning, but I also see a certain defect in this method if taken
> as self-sufficient, without examination of the term’s etymology and
> contextual usages. The problem is that the experience of different subjects
> (that is, practitioners) can lead to contrary conclusions. In fact, this
> problem can even arise when one takes account of linguistic and contextual
> factors.
>
> An example of current interest is the question whether it is possible to
> attain the first stage of awakening (sotāpatti) purely on the basis of
> insight without prior attainment of the jhānas. There are contemporary
> meditation teachers who assert, apparently on the basis of personal
> experience and related considerations, that it is possible; others say that
> it is not possible. This example may not be perfect, because one might
> argue that the person who has attained sotāpatti after attaining the jhānas
> has no basis for repudiating the claim that sotāpatti can be attained
> without prior attainment of the jhānas; whereas the “bare insight”
> practitioner can claim an experiential basis for asserting that sotāpatti
> can be attained without the jhānas. To resolve their differences, they
> would eventually have to turn to the texts, and at that point a
> disagreement could still arise over which texts should be considered
> pivotal for resolving their difference.
>
> Jhāna-practitioners often argue that if we rely solely on the Nikāyas, it
> is clear that jhāna, being the substance of sammā samādhi in the noble
> eightfold path, is necessary for attaining any fruition. Bare
> insight-practitioners usually regard the Visuddhimagga and commentaries as
> authoritative, and on this basis affirm the possibility of proceeding on
> the basis of “bare insight” without prior attainment of the jhānas.
>
> I have read of another disagreement between highly accomplished
> meditators: over the question whether (for the jhāna-attainer) insight is
> to be practiced within the jhāna or after emerging from the jhāna. Both
> claim to base their positions on personal experience, but they also seek
> textual support. Some practitioners who regard the Nikāyas as their sole
> authority—and regard the commentaries as departing from the original intent
> of the text—contend that insight can be practiced within the jhāna itself;
> they often appeal for support to such suttas as MN 64 and MN 52, in both of
> which it seems that insight is being developed while the meditator is in
> jhāna. Those who contend that the meditator must emerge from jhāna in order
> to develop insight appeal to the commentaries and Vism, which maintain that
> the meditator must emerge from jhāna in order to develop insight.
>
> Second, you ask me to draw out the implications of the refrains in the
> “samādhi suttas” of AN Tens and Elevens.
>
>
> On this basis, I would like to ask of you your opinion regarding the
> following question. Taking into account AN 10.7 *Sāriputtasuttaṃ*, 10.8 *
> Jhānasuttaṃ*, 11.7 *Saññāsuttaṃ*, 11.8 *Manasikārasuttaṃ*, and 11.9 (or
> 11.10) *Saddhasuttaṃ*, what do you make of the implications of their
> respective refrains:
>
> AN 10.6: *saññī ca pana assā ti*
> AN 10.7: *saññī ca pana ahosin ti*
> AN 11.7: *saññī ca pana assā ti*
> AN 11.8: *manasi ca pana kareyyā ti*
> AN 11.9 (or 11.10): *jhāyati ca pana*
>
> Of course, I ask this question with reference to the *context *of each of
> these five *suttāni*, the context being profoundly comprehensive: ranging,
>
> in AN 10.6-7, from the perception of ‘earth’ to the perception of ‘neither
> this world nor the next’, with AN 11.7-9 (or 10) adding “what is seen,
> heard, sensed, cognised, attained, sought, traversed in thought by the
> mind”
> * *(*yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ
> manasā*) to the list of what is not perceived, not attended to in mind, and
> not meditated upon, respectively.
>
> Given that these *sutta*s assert, on the one hand, the ‘disappearance’ or
>
> ‘cessation’ of this very broad spectrum of ‘objects of perception’, yet, on
> the other hand, they assert that, even after such ‘disappearance’ or
> ‘cessation’ has been effected, there still remains a certain *
> consciousness-of* (one is still *percipient* (AN 10.6-7 and AN 11.87); one
> still *attends in mind* (AN 11.8), one still *meditates* (AN 11.9 (or
>
> 11.10)), what, in your understanding, does this imply about the nature of
> such a consciousness?
>
> All except AN 10.7 tell us that, in such a meditative state, what we might
> call the ‘object’ of consciousness is as follows:
>
> ‘This is peaceful, this is the extreme: this calming of all formations,
> forsaking of all attachments, extinction of craving, absence of desire,
> cessation, *Nibbāna*.’
>
> *
> *
>
> *‘etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho
> sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānan’ti*.
>
> It seems to me that these texts are indicating two things: first, that
> this attainment is not to be identified with saññāvedayita-nirodha, in
> which all saññā (and presumably manasikāra) would be absent; and second,
> that the “object” or “domain” of this special samādhi is nibbāna, which is
> apprehended by a direct meditative experience. The commentary to AN 10.6
> says that the formula indicates this to be an attainment with thought
> (savitakkasamāpatti), but I doubt that the meditator would need to mentally
> verbalize this formula (in full or in part) within the samādhi. Perhaps the
> formula could be seen as expressing the line of reflection the meditator
> uses to enter this samādhi and the line of reflection that arises after
> emerging from this state. I do not see the fact that the meditator is
> “percipient” (saññī) to require that he also be engaged in vitakka.
>
> The commentary to AN 10.6 identifies this samādhi with phalasamāpatti
> (sabbampetaṃ phalasamāpattisamādhiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ). To my knowledge the
> term phalasamāpatti does not occur in the old Nikāyas, but passages like
> this provide a basis for it. It’s interesting that the suttas speaks simply
> about a bhikkhu and do not identify this bhikkhu with the standard arahant
> formula. These passages can thus serve as canonical support for the
> commentarial thesis that each of the four noble ones has access to the
> fruition-attainment that corresponds to his or her level of realization.
> The possible exception to this is AN 11.9, in which the gods pay homage to
> the meditator and declare him to be purisuttama, “a supreme person,” an
> expression that I suppose would be used only with reference to an arahant.
>
>
> AN 10.7 provides a most interesting and informative variation upon this
> theme:
> ‘Cessation of becoming is Nibbāna, cessation of becoming is Nibbāna’ – one
> perception arose in me, friend, another perception ceased. Just as,
> friend, when a woodchip fire is burning, one flame arises, another flame
> ceases; just so, friend, ‘Cessation of becoming is Nibbāna, cessation of
> becoming is Nibbāna’ – one perception arose, another perception ceased. And
> so at that time, friend, I was percipient of ‘Cessation of becoming is
> Nibbāna, cessation of becoming is Nibbāna’.
>
> *“bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan”ti kho me, āvuso, aññāva
>
> saññā uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. seyyathāpi, āvuso, sakalikaggissa
> jhāyamānassa aññāva acci uppajjati aññāva acci nirujjhati; evamevaṃ kho,
> āvuso, ‘bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti aññāva saññā
> uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. ‘bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti saññī ca
> panāhaṃ, āvuso, tasmiṃ samaye ahosin”ti.*
>
> This is the sutta in this set that I have found most problematic. I would
> interpret it to mean that Sāriputta was percipient that “cessation of
> becoming is Nibbāna” before entering the attainment and immediately after
> emerging from it. Throughout the attainment he would have been percipient
> of nibbāna but without relying on the verbal formula. This is just a
> conjecture.
>
> With metta,
>
> Bhikkhu Bodhi
>
> From: palistudy@yahoogroups.com [mailto:palistudy@yahoogroups.com] On
> Behalf Of Khristos Nizamis
> Sent: Sunday, October 14, 2012 3:25 AM
> To: palistudy@yahoogroups.com
>
> Subject: Re: [palistudy] vibhuta in AN 11.10
>
> Venerable Bodhi,
>
> I agree with your argument, evidence, and conclusion concerning the most
> plausible sense of the term *vibhūta* in the context of AN 11.10. I went
> through a virtually identical procedure about a year ago concerning this *
> sutta* and this particular term (although I made use of the search function
>
> of Digital Pāli Reader, which I personally found to be superior to, and
> more efficient than, that of the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana Tipiṭaka: e.g., one can
> find all derivative forms within a selected range of texts by utilising
> just the prefix + stem *vibhūt*-, which, as far as I am aware, at least,
>
> cannot be done with CST).
>
> Moreover, I agree with you that in trying to comprehend the sense or
> meaning of Pāli terms in actual contexts, one must give attention not only
> (1) to etymological, lexical, grammatical, and syntactical considerations,
> but also (2) to parallel and cognate discursive or contextual
> considerations (as you have done, for example, by comparing not the word
> itself but the parallel or cognate contextual sense of AN 11.7 and 11.8,
> and also, I am sure, of AN 10.7 and 10.8).
>
> This leads me to the following assertion: there is also a third kind of
> consideration that, ideally, can and should be taken into account, once we
> have examined, as closely and thoroughly as possible, the kinds of
> considerations (1) and (2). This third kind is what I would call (3) a *
> phenomenological* (or more broadly, an *experiential*) consideration of the
>
> possible and probable sense of a term/concept in its given instances and
> contexts. This does not require that we must personally have experienced
> the state of consciousness in question (although that is certainly the
> ideal scenario); but that the understanding of such a state can be
> extrapolated in a phenomenologically (or experientially) consistent way
> from the basis of what is most essentially and evidently true within what
> we *do* know about those states of consciousness that we certainly
> *have*experienced, especially through our engagement with relevant
>
> kinds of
> practice.
>
> On this basis, I would like to ask of you your opinion regarding the
> following question. Taking into account AN 10.7 *Sāriputtasuttaṃ*, 10.8 *
> Jhānasuttaṃ*, 11.7 *Saññāsuttaṃ*, 11.8 *Manasikārasuttaṃ*, and 11.9 (or
> 11.10) *Saddhasuttaṃ*, what do you make of the implications of their
> respective refrains:
>
> AN 10.6: *saññī ca pana assā ti*
>
> AN 10.7: *saññī ca pana ahosin ti*
>
> AN 11.7: *saññī ca pana assā ti*
>
> AN 11.8: *manasi ca pana kareyyā ti*
>
> AN 11.9 (or 11.10): *jhāyati ca pana*
>
> Of course, I ask this question with reference to the *context *of each of
> these five *suttāni*, the context being profoundly comprehensive: ranging,
>
> in AN 10.6-7, from the perception of ‘earth’ to the perception of ‘neither
> this world nor the next’, with AN 11.7-9 (or 10) adding “what is seen,
> heard, sensed, cognised, attained, sought, traversed in thought by the
> mind”
> * *(*yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ
> manasā*) to the list of what is not perceived, not attended to in mind, and
> not meditated upon, respectively.
>
> Given that these *sutta*s assert, on the one hand, the ‘disappearance’ or
>
> ‘cessation’ of this very broad spectrum of ‘objects of perception’, yet, on
> the other hand, they assert that, even after such ‘disappearance’ or
> ‘cessation’ has been effected, there still remains a certain *
> consciousness-of* (one is still *percipient* (AN 10.6-7 and AN 11.87); one
> still *attends in mind* (AN 11.8), one still *meditates* (AN 11.9 (or
>
> 11.10)), what, in your understanding, does this imply about the nature of
> such a consciousness?
>
> All except AN 10.7 tell us that, in such a meditative state, what we might
> call the ‘object’ of consciousness is as follows:
>
> ‘This is peaceful, this is the extreme: this calming of all formations,
> forsaking of all attachments, extinction of craving, absence of desire,
> cessation, *Nibbāna*.’
>
> *
> *
>
> *‘etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho
> sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho nibbānan’ti*.
>
>
> AN 10.7 provides a most interesting and informative variation upon this
> theme:
>
> ‘Cessation of becoming is Nibbāna, cessation of becoming is Nibbāna’ – one
> perception arose in me, friend, another perception ceased. Just as,
> friend, when a woodchip fire is burning, one flame arises, another flame
> ceases; just so, friend, ‘Cessation of becoming is Nibbāna, cessation of
> becoming is Nibbāna’ – one perception arose, another perception ceased. And
> so at that time, friend, I was percipient of ‘Cessation of becoming is
> Nibbāna, cessation of becoming is Nibbāna’.
>
> *“bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan”ti kho me, āvuso, aññāva
>
> saññā uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. seyyathāpi, āvuso, sakalikaggissa
> jhāyamānassa aññāva acci uppajjati aññāva acci nirujjhati; evamevaṃ kho,
> āvuso, ‘bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti aññāva saññā
> uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. ‘bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti saññī ca
> panāhaṃ, āvuso, tasmiṃ samaye ahosin”ti.*
>
>
> I look forward to your observations and reflections.
>
> With deep respect and metta,
>
> Khristos Nizamis
>
> For possible convenience, I list the relevant contexts below:
>
> AN 10.6:
>
> “siyā, ānanda, bhikkhuno tathārūpo samādhipaṭilābho yathā neva pathaviyaṃ
> pathavisaññī assa, na āpasmiṃ āposaññī assa, na tejasmiṃ tejosaññī assa, na
> vāyasmiṃ vāyosaññī assa, na ākāsānañcāyatane ākāsānañcāyatanasaññī assa, na
> viññāṇañcāyatane viññāṇañcāyatanasaññī assa, na ākiñcaññāyatane
> ākiñcaññāyatanasaññī assa, na nevasaññānāsaññāyatane
> nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasaññī assa, na idhaloke idhalokasaññī assa, na
> paraloke paralokasaññī assa; saññī ca pana assā”ti. . . .
>
> “idhānanda, bhikkhu evaṃsaññī hoti — ‘etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ
> sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho
> nibbānan’ti.
>
> AN 10.7:
>
> “siyā, āvuso ānanda, bhikkhuno tathārūpo samādhipaṭilābho yathā neva
> pathaviyaṃ pathavisaññī assa ... pe ... na paraloke paralokasaññī assa;
> saññī ca pana assā”ti. . . .
>
> “ekamidāhaṃ, āvuso ānanda, samayaṃ idheva sāvatthiyaṃ viharāmi
> andhavanasmiṃ. tatthāhaṃ tathārūpaṃ samādhiṃ samāpajjiṃ yathā neva
> pathaviyaṃ pathavisaññī ahosiṃ, na āpasmiṃ āposaññī ahosiṃ, na tejasmiṃ
> tejosaññī ahosiṃ, na vāyasmiṃ vāyosaññī ahosiṃ, na ākāsānañcāyatane
> ākāsānañcāyatanasaññī ahosiṃ, na viññāṇañcāyatane viññāṇañcāyatanasaññī
> ahosiṃ, na ākiñcaññāyatane ākiñcaññāyatanasaññī ahosiṃ, na
> nevasaññānāsaññāyatane nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasaññī ahosiṃ, na idhaloke
> idhalokasaññī ahosiṃ, na paraloke paralokasaññī ahosiṃ; saññī ca pana
> ahosin”ti. . . .
>
> “bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan”ti kho me, āvuso, aññāva saññā
> uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. seyyathāpi, āvuso, sakalikaggissa
> jhāyamānassa aññāva acci uppajjati aññāva acci nirujjhati; evamevaṃ kho,
> āvuso, ‘bhavanirodho nibbānaṃ bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti aññāva saññā
> uppajjati aññāva saññā nirujjhati. ‘bhavanirodho nibbānan’ti saññī ca
> panāhaṃ, āvuso, tasmiṃ samaye ahosin”ti.
>
> AN 11.7
>
> “evaṃ kho, ānanda, siyā bhikkhuno tathārūpo samādhipaṭilābho yathā neva
> pathaviyaṃ pathavisaññī assa, na āpasmiṃ āposaññī assa, na tejasmiṃ
> tejosaññī assa, na vāyasmiṃ vāyosaññī assa, na ākāsānañcāyatane
> ākāsānañcāyatanasaññī assa, na viññāṇañcāyatane viññāṇañcāyatanasaññī
> T.5.345 assa, na ākiñcaññāyatane ākiñcaññāyatanasaññī assa, na
> nevasaññānāsaññāyatane nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasaññī assa, na idhaloke
> idhalokasaññī assa, na paraloke paralokasaññī assa, yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ
> mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā, tatrāpi na saññī
> assa, saññī ca pana assā”ti. . . .
>
> “idha, āvuso ānanda, bhikkhu evaṃsaññī hoti — ‘etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ,
> yadidaṃ sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo
> nirodho nibbānan’ti.
>
> AN 11.8:
>
> “siyā, ānanda, bhikkhuno tathārūpo samādhipaṭilābho yathā na cakkhuṃ manasi
> kareyya, na rūpaṃ manasi kareyya, na sotaṃ manasi kareyya, na saddaṃ manasi
> kareyya, na ghānaṃ manasi kareyya, na gandhaṃ manasi kareyya, na jivhaṃ
> manasi kareyya, na rasaṃ manasi kareyya, na kāyaṃ manasi kareyya, na
> phoṭṭhabbaṃ manasi kareyya, na pathaviṃ manasi kareyya, na āpaṃ manasi
> kareyya, na tejaṃ manasi kareyya, na vāyaṃ manasi kareyya, na
> ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ manasi kareyya, na viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ manasi kareyya, na
> ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ manasi kareyya, na nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ manasi kareyya,
> na idhalokaṃ manasi kareyya, na paralokaṃ manasi kareyya, yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ
> sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā, tampi na
> manasi kareyya; manasi ca pana kareyyā”ti. . . .
>
> “idhānanda, bhikkhu evaṃ manasi karoti — ‘etaṃ santaṃ etaṃ paṇītaṃ, yadidaṃ
> sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhipaṭinissaggo taṇhākkhayo virāgo nirodho
> nibbānan’ti.
>
> AN 11.9 (or AN 11.10):
>
> “idha, saddha, bhadrassa purisājānīyassa pathaviyaṃ pathavisaññā vibhūtā
> hoti, āpasmiṃ āposaññā vibhūtā hoti, tejasmiṃ tejosaññā vibhūtā hoti,
> vāyasmiṃ vāyosaññā vibhūtā hoti, ākāsānañcāyatane ākāsānañcāyatanasaññā
> vibhūtā hoti, viññāṇañcāyatane viññāṇañcāyatanasaññā vibhūtā hoti,
> ākiñcaññāyatane ākiñcaññāyatanasaññā vibhūtā hoti, nevasaññānāsaññāyatane
> nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasaññā vibhūtā hoti, idhaloke idhalokasaññā vibhūtā
> hoti, paraloke paralokasaññā vibhūtā hoti, yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ
> viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ anuvicaritaṃ manasā, tatrāpi saññā vibhūtā
> hoti. evaṃ jhāyī kho, saddha, bhadro purisājānīyo neva pathaviṃ nissāya
> jhāyati ... pe ... yampidaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātaṃ pattaṃ pariyesitaṃ
> anuvicaritaṃ manasā, tampi nissāya na jhāyati; jhāyati ca pana. . . .
>
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>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>
> 
>


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