**Dear Nina and Moderator: again, citations in my post seem to look like `alphanumeric soup'. Sorry, I haven't quite worked out what the technical problem is with pasting UTF-8 text into posts. Rather than waste your time and give you headaches, I've reformatted this post using good old Velthius.** :-)

Hi Nina: I admire and respect your devotion to working with the texts and understanding them in your actual practice. You must be busy, and I don't want to distract you or add more to your plate. But your example just raised two thoughts.

In your post you wrote:

"As to the wrong view of self, one sees the self as controller ... as possessor. For instance, one believes that there is a self who can at will induce the arising of pa~n~naa. Whereas pa~n~naa is a cetasika that can only arise because of the appropriate conditions."

Maybe we should be careful, though, not to throw the bathwater out with the baby.

1. Agreed that pa~n~naa is a `cetasika' (in the Abhidhamma sense), inasmuch as, in the Suttaani, it is referred to as a dhamma: e.g., MN 43 says (at i.292):

"Pa~n~naa ya~nca vi~n~naa.na.m ime dhammaa sa.msa.t.thaa no visa.msa.t.thaa. . . . Ya~ncaavuso pajaanaati ta.m vijaanaati. Ya.m vijaanaati ta.m pajaanaati."

"Pa~n~naa and vi~n~naa.na.m - these dhammaa are conjoined, not disjoined. . . . For, friend, what one wisely understands, that one cognizes, and what one cognizes, that one wisely understands."

This may or may not raise a question about whether pa~n~naa and vi~n~naa.na.m in the first sentence should be taken to refer primarily to what might very roughly be called `mental content' (your `cetasika'); Ven. Bodhi translates dhammaa here as `states', which can only be understood as `mental states'; whereas the verbs pajaanaati and vijaanaati refer primarily to function and experience, i.e., to the `consciousness-of' that `mental content' or `mental state'. Perhaps this is supported by the following passage, a little farther on in the same text (i.293):

"Neyya.m panaavuso dhamma.m kena pajaanaatii"ti.
Neyya.m kho aavuso dhamma.m pa~n~naacakkhunaa pajaanaatiiti.
"Pa~n~naa panaavuso kimatthiyaa"ti?
Pa~n~naa kho aavuso abhi~n~natthaa pari~n~natthaa pahaanatthaati.

"Friend, with what does one wisely understand a dhamma that can be wisely known?"
"Friend, one understands a dhamma that can be wisely known with the `wisdom-eye' (pa~n~naacakkhunaa)."
"Friend, what is the purpose of pa~n~naa?"
"The purpose of pa~n~naa, friend, is direct knowledge, its purpose is full understanding, its purpose is abandoning."

Of course, it is very difficult (well, impossible) to separate out `mental content' or `mental state' from the act of `knowing', of `recognising', of `intuiting'; but, at the same time, there is surely an important distinction to be recognised between the act of `knowing' and what is `known' in and through that act.

2. Again, since pa~n~naa is a dhamma (of the type `cetasika', according to Abhidhamma), it is paticca-samuppanna, dependently co-arisen, it is dependent upon conditions. But it does not arise arbitrarily, nor does it arise merely automatically or deterministically. MN 43 again says (at i.293):

"pa~n~naa bhaavetabbaa, vi~n~naa.na.m pari~n~neyya.m",

"pa~n~naa is to be developed (cultivated), vi~n~naa.na is to be thoroughly understood".

This raises the deep and fascinating problem of `agency'. True, we cannot just `will' pa~n~naa to arise. But we can, and we are exhorted to, develop and cultivate the conditions that will be conducive for pa~n~naa to arise: that is a matter for which we have some volitional responsibility, and also some volitional effectivity. Just a couple of classical examples, with which you will be familiar, of this sense of agency, are the following:

MN 32 (M i.215) "Idhaavuso . . . bhikkhu citta.m vasa.m vatteti, no ca bhikkhu cittassa vasena vattati."

"Here, friend, . . . a bhikkhu wields mastery over his mind, he does not let the mind wield mastery over him."

And again, MN 20 (M i.120-121):

"cetasaa citta.m abhinigga.nhitabba.m abhinippii.letabba.m abhisantaapetabba.m",
"he should beat down, constrain, and crush mind with mind".

There are several instances in the Suttaani where the doctrine or view of the moral efficacy of doing and not doing actions (of body, speech, and intellect) is ascribed to the Buddha. The strongest example is AN 2.1.4.3 (A i.62):

"Kiriyavaadii caaha.m braahma.na akiriyavaadii caati. . . . Akiriya.m kho aha.m braahma.na vadaami kaayaduccaritassa vaciiduccaritassa manoduccaritassa, anekavihitaana.m paapakaana.m akusalaana.m dhammaana.m akiriya.m vadaami. Kiriya~nca kho aha.m braahma.na vadaami kaayasucaritassa vaciisucaritassa manosucaritassa, anekavihitaana.m kusalaana.m dhammaana.m kiriya.m vadaami. Eva.m kho aha.m braahma.na kiriyavaadii ca akiriyavaadii caati."

"I am one who preaches action [kiriya], Brahmin, and one who preaches non-action [akiriya]. . . . I say `non-action', Brahmin, of wrongdoing by body, wrongdoing by speech, wrongdoing by thought; of manifold evil and unwholesome thoughts [dhammaa], I say `non-action'. And I say `action', Brahmin, of doing good by body, doing good by speech, doing good by thought; of manifold wholesome thoughts, I say `action'. In this way, Brahmin, I am one who preaches `action' and one who preaches `non-action'." (My trans.)

There's also a quite humorous instance (MN 71, at i.483), where Vaccha asks the Buddha if any aajivaka (`fatalist', who doesn't believe that willed action has any effect) has ever gone to heaven after death. The Buddha replies:

"Ito kho so vaccha ekanavuto kappo yamaha.m anussaraami naabhijaanaami ka~nci aajiivaka.m sagguupaga.m a~n~natra ekena, sopaasi kammavaadii kiriyavaadiiti."

"When I recollect the past ninety-one aeons, Vaccha, I do not recall any aajivaka who, on the dissolution of the body, went to heaven, with one exception, and he held the doctrine of the moral efficacy of action, the doctrine of the moral efficacy of deeds." (Ven. Nyanamoli's and Ven. Bodhi's trans.)

If we take the import of questions 1 and 2 together, we are invited to comprehend the nature of `knowing' and of `doing' in a way that admits their reality and efficacy, yet without having to posit an ontologically independent, separate, self-existing entity called an `attaa', to which the pronoun `aha.m' refers as though it were a name for an `object'.

Respectfully, with metta,
Khristos

--- In Pali@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom <vangorko@...> wrote:
>
> Dear Khristos and all,
> Thank you for your interesting observations.
> Khristos, I admire your keen observance, before I never gave this
> matter a thought. In fact your question makes me penetrate more
> deeply into the meaning of the text.
> For the sake of analysing I find it easier not to use the negation.
> The neuter eta.m as object of tanhaa can comprise so many things,
> even pa~n~nattis, which are not realities. Is it a solution to think
> of sabba.m? I cling to this or that, whatever appears. So, perhaps we
> can say that the neutre gender is sufficient, no need for another
> gender.
> 'This is of me'.
>
> I consulted 'The Root of Existence', Bikkhu Bodhi's translation of
> the Muulapariyaaya Sutta , and in his intro he says: <The construct
> 'this is mine' is a projection born of craving, for it is craving's
> function to appropriate things as the property of the self. >
> <Under the influence of conceit it becomes manifest in judgements and
> comparisons whereby we rank ourselves in relation to others as
> superior, equal of inferior. and under the influence of views, i.e.
> the theoretical bent of thought, the ego-bias issues in dogmas,
> tenets, and speculations concerning reality and nature of the
> personal self and its locus, the world.>
>
> N: As to conceit, esoham asmi, here the eso is correct, because one
> thinks of oneself to be thus or thus. I think of the 'I am conceit",
> asmi maana.
> As to the wrong view of self, one sees the self as controller (as
> Lennart mentioned), as possessor. For instance, one believes that
> there is a self who can at will induce the arising of Pa~n~naa.
> Whereas pa~n~naa is a cetasika that can only arise because of the
> appropriate conditions.
> Nina.
>
> Op 30-jun-2010, om 5:57 heeft k_nizamis het volgende geschreven:
>
> > Yet, please be patient with me a moment more, because I'm not yet
> > completely satisfied with the explanation at an intuitive
> > linguistic level. I'm still trying to understand the `sense' of the
> > one nt. nom. sg. and the two masc. nom. sg. demonstrative pronouns
> > in this formula.
>
>
>
> [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
>