Hello Ven,


Well, now we move to deeper matters. When dialogue shifts levels
like this, i take it as a sign that something significant is
happening.

Your latest post calls into question not merely the facts and
details of a debate, but the terms under which it operates. We
return to questions of meaning, truth, and authenticity.

In Indian Buddhism, exactly the same process happened. The various
scholars, yogis, or whoever, debated over the interpretation of
various doctrinal points - this can be seen clearly in, for example,
the Kathavatthu of the Theravada or the Vijnanakaya of the
Sarvastivada.

Later, the terms of the debate itself came more into question: how
do we know something is true? Thus arose the Pramaa.navaada, the
theories of epistemology that dominated later Indian Buddhist
philosophy (Dignaga, Dharmakirti).

So we can see that the forms and processes that characterize our own
debates on this list echo, in their own way, issues that have been
of profound importance to Buddhists of all types and ages.

In Buddhism, epistemology differs from Western theory on a number of
crucial grounds.

One important difference is theat in the West, truth has usually
been sought for its own sake. Whereas for Buddhists, something must
not only be true, but also be useful. Thus Buddhism ultimately
repudiates the fact/value distinction that underlies the philosophy
of science. The truth must lead to liberation.

Another difference is that, whereas Western philosophers since
Socrates have emphasized reason as a means to truth, Buddhism (and
other Indian systems) emphasized direct experience of the truth
(pratyaksa): the non-conceptual vision of bare phenomena.

Inference (anumaana) is recognized as a way of knowing the truth,
albeit less reliable than direct experience.

But there is a crucial dilemma here: we also have gone to the Dhamma
by faith. We believe that the Buddha 'knew it all', if not in the
sense of vulgar omniscience, at least in the crucial sense of
knowing exactly what is necessary for liberation. This is quite
different from western philosophy, where Socrates cheerfully
admitted his own ignorance, and is more akin, though not identical,
with the attitude of Western religions.

If it is admitted that the Buddha 'knew', it would be sheer
foolishness to discard his teachings. And yet, as conceptual
knowledge, the teachings can only ever approach the truth, and must
forever fall short of the truth itself.

The ancient schools equivocated on precisely this point: some of
them included the testimony of reliable tradition under anumaana,
some had it as a separate and distinctive pramana itself.

The traditions debated vigorously over which texts are to be
considered authentic, for precisely this reason. If a text can be
believed to stem for the Buddha himself, then we, as followers of
the Buddha, may rely on these teachings, not as absolute truth in
themselves, but as a guide leading us to the truth. If, however,
they do not come from the Buddha, we would have to raise the
question as to whether the teachings are really liberating.

The various traditions frequently mention debate among the monks as
to which texts are considered authentic. I don't have references to
hand, but one example i know is the first chapter of the Atthasalini
(which story deserves telling here, as it skillfully integrates two
of the recent themes of this list: authenticity and humor). Similar
questions are raised in the Northern traditions.

One of the things that is noteworthy in such debates is that they
frequently question such texts as are, in fact, generally regarded
as late by modern scholars, such as the Abhidhamma,
Patisambhidamagga, Parivara, Jatakas, Mahayana Sutras, etc. That is
to say, there was a sceptical strand within the tradition -
considered important enough to be refuted by the mainstream - that
frequently agrees with the findings of modern research.

From here i might return to more directly commenting on your message.


> general trend, whether referring to Buddhist doctrine or the
verity of
> certain teachings, to cite Western or non-Buddhist sources as
authority.

The important thing is to cite appropriate authorities who are
experts in their field. Since the traditions generally assume that
all their particular texts are early, they have not been interested
in such matters and hance have little to say beyond repeating the
traditional accounts.


I
> suppose this could come from not speaking any Asian language for
some,

But for others it comes from speaking several Asian languages. When
we are able to look at the Buddhist and other scriptures in many
languages, it becomes increasingly obvious that the Dhamma is not
exclusive to any one tradition.

if I wanted to learn more about sati,
> I would go and find a meditation master who practices it.

Of course! If you want to learn how to meditate, go see a meditation
teacher. But if you are interested in examining the meaning of the
Suttas in historical context, you will have to look elsewhere. There
are plenty of meditation teachers who, through not being grounded in
the Suttas, teach interpretations of particular texts that are
kooky, if not positively dangerous.

And I think I
> would hesitate to look to Rhys-Davids or A.K. Warder for proof of
the age of
> any of the parts of the tipitaka, no matter how much I still rely
on their
> grammar books or translations.

No scholar can offer 'proof' as to such questions, all we can do is
present evidence and draw inferences. But these scholars have done
valuable work, which sometimes we rely on without realizing it. For
example, i assume that many of the people om this list would agree
that the Mahayana Sutras, or even more so the tantras, are not
Buddhavacana: but how do we know this? Really, only by faith in a
tradition or by use of historical criticism. Faith may be fine for
those who have it, but not very useful for persuading those who do
not.

I might further comment that it is sometimes objected that
historical studies are just a 'western' thing. While it is true that
Western methods have informed and influenced such studies, it must
be remembered that the traditions since India have had some
awareness of historical context. I recent times, it was a Japanese
scholar (i forget his name but will try to find it, for his is an
interesting story) who, several centuries ago, attempted the first
comprehensive chronological stratification of the Chinese canon, and
his results were generally accurate. And in the 20th Century, more
Buddhist studies have been produced in Japan than in the rest of the
world combined. Recently i was at a Global Buddhist Conference in
Singapore, where the Chinese Mahayana speaker admitted that the
Mahayana sutras cannot be regarded as literal Buddhavacana; but an
American monk later objected to me that this was just a Western idea!
Or again, in 20th century Thailand, many monks have raised issues of
authenticity in scriptures, such as Buddhadasa, Pra Dhammapitaka,
Luang Ta Maha Bua, etc.

Indeed, the tipitaka is such a jewel, I
> would not wish anyone to denegrate of any part of it.

But which Tripitaka? Why do you make your choice? Most people in
traditional countries do so because of the accidents of birth and
culture. Others do so from encountering a charismatic teacher.
Others do so through an undefined affinity. And there are some who
do so through, or aided by, a careful study of the texts in
historical and comparative context. If is for these that historical
argument is undertaken.

I am not sure what is
> implied by the later/earlier idea, but it seems either one of two
things:
>
> 1) the format (e.g. rhyme, syntax) of the teaching was adapted
from the
> orginal at various times in history, or
>
> 2) the doctrine was "thought up" at various times after the Lord
Buddha
> passed away.

Yes, both of these things. There is no doubt that the first happens
when, for example, we see versions of the Ratana Sutta in Pali and
hybrid Skt that have virtually the same words in different dialect.

I wonder at how often these claims are
> made, along with the differing claims of "later" and "earlier" in
regards to
> the nikayas. What is the purpose of this?

In part, it is simply an expression of the emphasis on scepticism
among western scholars, which itself is a reaction to the forceful
insistence on orthodoxy among certain Christians.

Is there something about certain
> teachings, or even certain nikayas which seems unhelpful, indeed
perhaps
> negative in its impact on the rest (usually given as a very paltry
set of
> two or three "earlier" books) of the texts that leads one to
suspect its
> authenticity?

This may or may not be the case. Generally, i think it is obvious
that the Nikayas present a remarkably uniform doctrine. Yet we still
use what analytical tools we have, in order to be able to ask the
question. Once we can meaningfully, and with due caution,
distinguish between various strata on text-historical grounds, we
can then evaluate possible differences in meaning and doctrine. If
there aren't any, great!

It is, of course, a self-defeating flaw of much historical criticism
that it assumes what the doctrine originally was (that is, it agrees
with the scholar's own views), and then analyses the texts
accordingly, only to find that, amazingly, the texts agrees with the
views of the scholar!

So we must try to be doctrine-neutral, and rely as much as possible
on textual criteria. I have recently found structural analysis very
useful, and believe that this reveals a more clearly organized
scriptural collection, which turns out to be focussed around the
four noble truths.

In some cases, conclusions about the scriptures are made that can
clearly be disproven. On example of this is the view that the
Mahayana was a primarily lay-based movement. This view, long
influential, has now been discarded among scholars. Another popular
theory was that 'original Buddhism' was about ascetics living in the
forest, and monastic life - and with it the Vinaya - was a much
later invention. I think this idea is both wrong and pernicious, and
think that it can be clearly disproven by a re-evaluation of the
evidence. Since text-historical arguments are, in fact, influential,
we must become skilled in how to use them to make sure that they are
not misused to damage the Dhamma.

It is strange to me, but then of course
> if I asked any of the scholars and meditation teachers here about
it, I
> think they would tell me Westerners think too much and doubt too
much. :)

Maybe, but why then the strong emphasis on debate, doctrine, and
authenticity among Indian Buddhism? Even within one strand, say, the
Theravada Atthakathas, there is abundant evidence of ongoing debate,
variety of interpretations, and so on. Surely this is a wholesome
sign of interest and vitality in a religion.

The Buddha encouraged discussion on the teachings. He strongly
condemmed those who present what is not Buddhavacana as
Buddhavacana. He gave guidelines for interpretation.

And then, he also said, don't waste your time on endless talk, get
out to the forest and jhaayatha bhikkhave!

in Dhamma

Bhante Sujato