> Dear Lars,
> I think the most important point is to know the meaning when we read
> it. If we are studying the Paticcasamuppada then it is obvious that
> vinnana is given a separate category. If we are studying the
> commentaries they make it clear that sometimes when they use 'nama'
> it includes vinnana and sometimes not.
That is what I mean. The use of nama as mentality is something introduced by
the commentaries and is not to be found in the suttas. But here then, we
were concerned with translating the suttas, so nama should certainly not be
translated in commentarial terms.
I shall add two passages to give some more food for thought:
This is from "The Nibbana Sermons" Part 1 by Bhikkhu K. Nanananda
(
http://www.beyondthenet.net/calm/clm_main1.htm):
---
...We find ourselves in a similar situation with regard to the
significance of ruupa in naama-ruupa. Here too we have something deep, but
many take naama-ruupa to mean `mind and matter'. Like materialists, they
think there is a contrast between mind and matter. But according to the
Dhamma there is no such rigid distinction. It is a pair that is
interrelated and taken together it forms an important link in the chain of
pa.ticca samuppaada.
Ruupa exists in relation to `name' and that is to say that form is known
with the help of `name'.
---
The whole discussion there is very interestig.
Then we have a part from Nanavira Thera's "Notes on Dhamma"
(
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/9366/sn-nama.htm):
---
The passage at Dígha ii,2 [9] is essential for an understanding of námarúpa,
and it rules out the facile and slipshod interpretation of námarúpa as
'mind-&-matter'...
...When náma is understood as 'mind' or 'mentality' it will inevitably
include viññána or consciousness -- as, for example, in the Visuddhimagga
(Ch. XVIII passim). This is entirely without justification in the Suttas;
and it is clear enough that any mode of thinking that proposes to make a
fundamental division between 'mind' and 'matter' will soon find itself among
insuperable difficulties. 'Mind' (i.e. mano in one of its senses) already
means 'imagination' as opposed to 'reality', and it cannot also be opposed
to 'matter'. 'Reality' and 'matter' are not by any means the same thing --
is real pain (as opposed to imaginary pain) also material pain? There are,
to be sure, various distinctions between body and mind (in different
senses); and we may speak of bodily (káyika) pain as opposed to mental or
volitional (cetasika) pain -- see Majjhima v,4 Vedaná Samy. iii,2 --, but
these are distinctions of quite a different kind. Bodily pain may be real or
imaginary, and so may volitional pain (grief), but material pain -- painful
feeling composed of matter -- is a contradiction in terms.
[9] Dígha ii,2:
"'From consciousness as a requisite condition comes name-and-form.' Thus it
has been said. And this is the way to understand how from consciousness as a
requisite condition comes name-and-form. If consciousness were not to
descend into the mother's womb, would name-and-form take shape in the womb?"
"No, lord."
"If, after descending into the womb, consciousness were to depart, would
name-and-form be produced for this world?"
"No, lord."
"If the consciousness of the young boy or girl were to be cut off, would
name-and-form ripen, grow, and reach maturity?"
"No, lord."
"Thus this is a cause, this is a reason, this is an origination, this is a
requisite condition for name-and-form, i.e., consciousness." .
---
Lars