--- In
cybalist@yahoogroups.com, george knysh <gknysh@...> wrote:
>
> --- On Sun, 7/11/10, Torsten <tgpedersen@...> wrote:
>
> > --- On Mon, 6/28/10, Torsten <tgpedersen@> wrote:
>
>
> Plutarch takes Olthacus' murderous intentions as a fact
> http://tinyurl.com/25yqmos
> whereas Appian is divided between assuming that and assuming
> Olcaba's intentions were those he stated himself
> http://tinyurl.com/327l7py ç79
>
>
> ****GK: Given what we know of Mithradates' suspicious nature, and
> his proclivities towards eliminating unreliable (to his mind)
> elements from his entourage, I think the earlier Plutarch version of
> Olthaces' motivation is preferable to Appian's dichotomic musing. I
> don't see how Olcaba/Olthacus couyld have survived a return to
> Mithradates if he had originally defected from him to Lucullus on
> his own initiative rather than as described by Plutarch.*****
On the other hand, if the whole thing had been a preconceived plot, it is difficult to see how Oltacus could have fingered the would-be defector Sobdacus after his return to Mithridates, as Appian states.
ibd.
'Thereupon the Scythian mounted his horse and went immediately to Mithridates, either because he had plotted against Lucullus and now thought that he was suspected, or because he considered himself insulted and was angry on that account. He exposed to Mithridates another Scythian, named Sobdacus, who was about to desert to Lucullus. Sobdacus was accordingly arrested.'
> > 73 BC
> > http://www.attalus.org/bc1/year73.html
> > Beginning of Third Mithridatic War (- 63 BC)
>
>
>
> >
> > 63 BC
> > http://www.attalus.org/bc1/year63.html
> >
> > Mithridates VI plans invading Italy
> > http://tinyurl.com/32p539j
>
> ****GK: He seems to have planned this (initially) in Colchis in the
> winter of 66/65: cf. Appian #101. Cf.
http://www.livius.org/ap-ark/appian/appian_mithridatic_21.html#%A7101****
It seems more likely to me that the Bosphorus mentioned was the 'real'
Bosphorus, since that is connected with the legend of Hera's travels
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosphorus
not the Maeotian one (as note 1 seem to imply), and that Mithridates was accordingly planning a tour around the Black sea and attack the Romans from the rear in Asia Minor.
...
> > The "Scythians" (Scythians proper
> > and Sarmatians) were independent auxiliaries who had to be bought
> > off by promises of dynastic alliances (Appian,#108). This did not
> > work. It is very clear that apart from "his own army"
> > Mithridates intended to draw on the Gauls, whom he had been
> > cultivating for some time (#109). He intended to lead his large
> > motley crew "through Thrace to Macedonia, through Macedonia to
> > Pannonia, and passing over the Alps into Italy" (#102)
>
> You seem to want to imply that Scythians and similar folk (this is
> Olthacus/Olcaba's home country, according to Plutarch) could not be
> made interested in such a large undertaking.
>
> ****GK: The point is that Appian used the term "Scythian" quite
> vaguely. He seems to include ancient Georgians (like the Heniochi),
> Maeotians (like Dardanians and others, usually subject to the
> Bosporan kingdom) and occasionally Scythians proper (whom he
> confuses with Sarmatians at e.g. ) as well as Sarmatians. The "Azov
> country" pertains to the Maeotians connected politically to
> Bosporus, like Olthaces' Dardanians, like Sinds and others listed by
> Strabo. These are the "princes" Mithradates initially drafted via
> dynastic alliances as described in Appian #102, which you cite here:
>
> Here is the full quote from Appian Mithridates ç102
> 'Mithridates finally reached the Azov country, of which there were
> many princes, all of whom received him, escorted him, and exchanged
> presents with him, on account of the fame of his deeds, his empire,
> and his power, which were still not to be despised. He formed
> alliances with them in contemplation of other and more novel
> exploits, such as marching through Thrace to Macedonia, through
> Macedonia to Pannonia, and passing over the Alps into Italy. With
> the more powerful of these princes he cemented the alliance by
> giving his daughters in marriage.'
>
> This text does not support your view.
>
> ****GK: But Appian #108/109 does. Mithradates needed to cement
> alliances with the powerful steppe nomads (Scythians and Sarmatians)
> who had earlier supported him. But he was betrayed. Cf.
http://www.livius.org/ap-ark/appian/appian_mithridatic_22.html#%A7109
>
> "Mithridates, observing these frequent defections, and having
> suspicions of the army itself, lest it should fail him because the
> service was compulsory and the taxes very heavy, and because
> soldiers always lack confidence in unlucky commanders, sent some of
> his daughters in charge of eunuchs to be married to the Scythian
> princes, asking them at the same time to send him reinforcements as
> quickly as possible. Five hundred soldiers accompanied them from his
> own army. Soon after they left the presence of Mithridates they
> killed the eunuchs who were leading them (for they always hated
> these persons, who were all-powerful with Mithridates) and conducted
> the young women to Pompey.
>
> [§109] Although bereft of so many children and castles and of his
> whole kingdom, and in no way fit for war, and although he could not
> expect any aid from the Scythians, still no inferior position, none
> corresponding to his present misfortunes, even then found a place in
> his mind. He proposed to turn his course to the Gauls, whose
> friendship he had cultivated a long time for this purpose, and with
> them to invade Italy, hoping that many of the Italians themselves
> would join him on account of their hatred of the Romans;"
And here you have to argue that none of the many planned contingents went on with the plan, supported with Roman gold.
>
> > The expedition was to start from
> > Panticapeion (today's Kertch in the Crimean Ukraine).
>
> I can't find your source for that?
>
> ****GK: It's in Appian #107. Mithradates made Panticapeion his
> center of operations. He was there in Appian #108, when he was
> drafting "his own army" (prior to his unsuccessful appeal to the
> steppe nomads) and there is no record of his leaving it.****
Right.
> > *Mithridates VI gives Olthaces the task of invading Italy.
> >
> > GK: Acc. to Appian, the King himself was to lead the army
>
> Where does he say that?
>
> > (there is no hint of any delegation in the text).
>
> I'll make an emendation: Olthaces was to be the leader of the allied
> Dandarian/Scythian army / expeditionary force.
>
> ****GK: We don't know that.
There might have been several such 'Scythian' (in the loose sense) armies, and Olthaces might have commanded only his own Dandarian army, but with financially powerful backers, who knows how many others could be enticed to join.
> In any case this, "Mithradates' own army", which he organized from
> Panticapeion, was to be assisted by the steppe nomads, and
> (hopefully) Burebista (since Mithradates wished to reach Italy via
> Thrace and Pannonia). But they never got started.****
Not on that path, which any contemporary historian would have noted. But would they have noted a 'Scythian' army/armies moving into Przeworsk? This is the time of the suddenly appearing 'upper layer' there.
> > *Olthaces as leader (*wod-in-) of an army (*wod-)
> > *invades Przeworsk by 'Schlieffen plan'
> > *going around Burebista's Dacia
> >
> > GK: The Mithridatian army gathered near Panticapeion, but the
> > expedition never got under way. There is no mention of any
> > out-movement by anyone.
>
> Movements in Scythian lands would be beyond the Roman horizon of
> interest.
>
> ****GK: Appian was certainly interested enough to point out that no
> such movement occurred in the steppes (#109)*****
I can't find that in §109?
> > Mithridates VI commits suicide
> >
> > ****GK: With the assistance of a Gaulish warrior.****
>
> Named Bituitus, a name known otherwise only from a king of the
> Arverni
> http://www.attalus.org/names/b/bituitus.html
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bituitus
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arverni
> so perhaps the Arverni were the Gauls Mithridates was in contact
> with?
And perhaps that's why Caesar mentions the old Arverni/Aedui conflict in connection the recent one between Sequani and Aedui, although he doesn't detail any involvement of the Arverni in the latter.
> > End of Third Mithridatic War
> > *Olthaces, the wod-in- in Przeworsk,
> > *must give up attempt for 'Schlieffen plan' against Italy and
> > *reconsider his options
> >
> > GK: This is pure novelistic fantasy. There is no evidence which
> > would link the career of Ariovistus to the figures of Mithradates
> > and Olthaces.
>
> Well, there's Snorri, of course (*hides under sofa*).
>
>
> > BTW it is possible (though hardly certain) that the Olthaces in
> > Pompey's triumph in 62 was Olthaces the Dandarian. He seems to
> > have been a very trusted ally of Mithradates, who just might have
> > appointed him "king" of reconquered Colchis (or parts thereof)
> > after the unsuccessful attempt on Lucullus. It is however equally
> > plausible that these Olthaces were distinct personalities.
> >
...
> > Olthaces was not Ariovistus.
>
> There's exactly fourteen years between Olthacus' defection to
> Mithridates
>
> ****GK: ?? what defection?****
Come on. Appian mentions it as a possiblity. Defection or return, then. No matter.
> and Ariovistus telling Caesar that his army had been without a roof
> for fourteen years.
>
> ****GK: This is incoherent. Olthacus the Dardanian certainly had a
> roof with Mithradates.*****
Incoherent yourself. Whatever roof Olthacus had with Mithridates was made of canvas, M. was constantly at war. The third, to be exact, 75-63.
> > And we have no evidence the Germanics were involved in
> > Mithradates' Italian plans.
>
> By 60/59, Burebista
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burebista
> conquers the Boii and Taurisci; in 65 he would already have been a
> force to avoid, and Olthaces would have been in a position to know
> that better than Mithridates.
>
> ****GK: Mithradates didn't seem to think so in Colchis. Cf. Appian
> #101.****
The mutiny you pointed out yourself took place because of his troops' very different assessment of that. A more cautious general would have agreed.
from
E. T. Salmon
Catiline, Crassus, and Caesar
The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 56, No. 4 (1935),
pp. 302-316
retrieved from jstor.org
'CATILINE, CRASSUS, AND CAESAR.
The suggestion that Crassus and Caesar were in some way implicated in the conspiracies of 66 and 63 was made in times contemporary with the events. It constitutes a problem that has been often investigated and usually answered with a firm negative. The latest English writer on the Catilinarian conspiracies comes to the conclusion that Crassus and Caesar did not countenance either of the attempted coups d'etat, and his opinion is probably shared by most scholars today. The late Dr. Hardy, it is true, comparatively recently adduced strong reasons for suspecting the complicity of Crassus and Caesar in the plot of 66, but the contention of Mommsen (History of Rome, IV, p. 486) that they were also privy to the plot of 63 has failed to win support. The question is worth re-opening because, in the view of the present writer, one important argument has not been put forward by either side.
The aim of this paper is to show that a plausible case can be made out for the complicity of Crassus and Caesar in 63. The question of their complicity in the affair of 66 need be touched on only briefly as it seems to me that the arguments of John (in his well-known paper in Jahrb. f. class. Philol., VIII, Suppl., 1876) and Hardy have not been convincingly refuted. In any case if Crassus and Caesar were concerned in the bigger affair of 63 then a fortiori the probability of their complicity in 66 is enhanced.
...
Now, one fact that must never be forgotten in studying the history of the period 66-62 is that Pompey's absence but ultimate homecoming with a victorious and presumably devoted army threw its shadow over the whole course of political events at Rome. Crassus, in particular, Pompey's personal enemy, had good reason to view the return of Pompey with apprehension. In the view of the present writer, every move that Crassus made in this period was dictated by anxiety about Pompey's return. It is here suggested that Crassus only bought over Julius Caesar, the man of greatest resolution among the populares (as his early defiance of Sulla and his recent rehabilitation of Marius proved) after the passing of the Gabinian
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lex_Gabinia
and Manilian
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lex_Manilia
proposals, both of which Crassus had opposed. Before 66 there is no evidence that Crassus was working with the democrats; in fact when he opposed the Gabinian and Manilian proposals he was also opposing Caesar and the democrats. But the moment the Manilian proposal became law Crassus lost no time in seeking a haven in an understanding with Caesar. Crassus adopted his usual method and loaned money freely to Caesar who in return "acted as the political manager of the great financier" (Marsh, The Founding of the Roman Empire, p. 74). Obviously so long as Mithridates was active in the east Pompey's hands were tied. But there had been an analogous situation some twenty years before. On that earlier occasion Sulla's hands too had been tied for some time owing to the activities of the king of Pontus; but finally Sulla was free to return to Rome and return he did. The writings of Cicero make it evident that in the sixties B. C. and even later the memory of Sulla's homecoming was still green. Pompey's enemies at Rome had no reason to think that Sulla's former protege would not copy his master's example, and certainly they had no desire to meet the fate of Cinna
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lucius_Cornelius_Cinna
and Carbo.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gnaeus_Papirius_Carbo
Accordingly while Pompey was away his opponents were manoeuvring in order, first, to have continually in office a favourable executive ready to command an emergency mobilisation of Italy and if need be to seize Pompey's children as hostages, and, secondly, as an additional precaution to obtain an army of their own with which they could face Pompey on his return. Crassus, who had made his fortune at Sulla's homecoming and therefore had good cause to remember what it was like, was Pompey's arch-enemy and could not have failed to notice the analogy between Pompey's position and Sulla's. He was accordingly in the forefront of all the anti-Pompey schemes. Of course Pompey's personal popularity prevented Crassus from openly avowing his aims. There is no need to think that Crassus' aim was to precipitate a civil war; but it was only the part of prudence to have an army behind him as a bargaining asset when he had to face Pompey on the latter's return. Otherwise he would never be able to bargain with Pompey on equal terms.
...
We now come to the year 63. As usual Crassus and Caesar had a scheme to procure an army and, also as usual, they had their own candidate for the consulship of 62.
...
However Crassus and Caesar went ahead with their plan to obtain a favourable executive. In 63 Catiline was once again their choice for the consulship. As on previous occasions, money was forthcoming with which to bribe the electorate on Catiline's behalf; and we may suspect that as before it was supplied by Crassus. Suddenly, however, there must have come to Rome the news of the defeat and death of Mithridates in the east. So far as I am aware the exact date of the Pontic king's demise has never been determined nor has its bearing on the Catilinarian conspiracy ever been considered. It certainly occurred in 63 and fairly early in the year, since Mithridates was already dead before Pompey went to Jerusalem in the spring of that year. News of the king's death must have come to Rome rapidly - certainly in the first half of 63. Crassus of course would immediately see the significance of the news. It meant that Pompey was now free to come home; he might even conceivably be in Italy late in 63 or early in 62, and Crassus was still without a favourable executive and without an army. It can hardly be doubted that in such circumstances he would resort to pretty desperate expedients in order to get an army. The assertion that the defeat of the Rullan proposal "marks the end of Crassus' campaign of precautions against Pompey" must be viewed with caution. Crassus still had one expedient left - a desperate one certainly - but nevertheless one that in Pompey's opinion was worth trying. The expedient was to create disturbances in Italy.
...
Therefore in the view of the writer what probably happened in 63 was this. Catiline's candidature was furthered with copious bribery - Crassus supplying the money - until the news of the defeat and death of Mithridates arrived. As this signified the imminence of Pompey's return, Crassus no longer wanted Catiline as consul designatus in 63; instead he wanted him as conspirator in the expectation that he, Crassus, or his man Caesar would be asked to suppress the resultant uprising. Accordingly when Cicero introduced a bribery law doubtless aimed at Catiline, Crassus, who now wanted a desperate Catiline, did not as in 64 suborn a tribune to veto it. In fact there is even some evidence that Crassus spoke on behalf of Cicero's electoral corruption law. Of course bribery laws in ancient Rome were honoured in the breach. In fact we know that this very law of Cicero's was flagrantly disregarded by Lurco in the very next year. But temporarily it would check the rampant bribery in 63 and would serve as a convenient pretext for Crassus to refuse further bribes on Catiline's behalf. Catiline, realising that his one chance for the consulship had been to bribe his way into it, now saw that he was certain to be an also-ran at the elections. Accordingly he determined to obtain by violence what he could not obtain by votes. He now turned conspirator - and in this for the time being Crassus supported him.'
Here on the motive for Crassus to dump Catiline I think Salmon is wrong. Basing a plan on the assumption that Cataline by necessity would have started an insurrection when dumped seems exceedingly reckless to me. And why would Crassus have done a fool thing like that, if an army was being formed right under his nose which he could obtain with his gold alone (that is, assuming he hadn't been financing Mithridates all the time, cf. the gold being shipped out at Puteoli and the mysterious money stashes Mithridates had in various locations (App. Mith. 101, 107)? And once Mithridates was dead, that army would have no master but Crassus, their financier. Rather what happened with Catiline was that he was involved, with Crassus and Caesar, with a plan to take over power in Rome by force, and when he was suddenly deserted and denounced by his backers, he was in the same situation as Stauffenberg after the main objective of the plan had failed: he had no option but to press on with the rest of the plan, even though the enterprise was doomed.
Now, given these facts it seems to me that rather than ask for evidence of Crassus' being involved in the build-up of armies to invade Rome one should ask for evidence why he wasn't.
Torsten