From: Patrick Ryan
Message: 40057
Date: 2005-09-16
----- Original Message -----
From: "Brian M. Scott" <BMScott@...>
To: "Patrick Ryan" <cybalist@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Friday, September 16, 2005 3:01 PM
Subject: Re[6]: [tied] *kW- "?"
> At 14:09:09 on Friday, 16 September 2005, Patrick Ryan
> wrote:
>
> > From: "Brian M. Scott" <BMScott@...>
>
> >>> It is certainly clear to me and any objective observer
> >>> what 'motivated' means in this context. Palatalization
> >>> occurs rather regularly before front vowels and /y/ in
> >>> innumerbale languages.
>
> >> Of course. It is fairly clear that some changes are
> >> likelier than others; that says nothing about whether all
> >> linguistic changes are motivated, or whether (or how) such a
> >> statement is even meaningful. It is also clear that some
> >> changes have no obvious motivation. And anyone who thinks
> >> seriously about what actually constitutes an explanation in
> >> historical linguistics -- and 'this change is motivated by
> >> X' is typically presented as an explanation -- must soon
> >> realize that the question isn't at all simple.
>
> > Ah, now you have identified the _real_ problem. Because a
> > motivation is not _obvious_ does not mean it is absent.
>
> Nor did I imply otherwise. However, you cannot defend the
> position that all changes are motivated by claiming that
> when no motivation is known, we simply haven't discovered it
> yet: that argument is circular.
***
Patrick:
No. It is not. Everything we can observe has a cause.
***
> > In this universe, all effects have causes.
>
> That's far from clear: consider vacuum energy and creation
> of virtual particles.
***
Patrick:
So scientists are wasting their time trying to identify the causes.
***
> > And here, I must tritely employ a favorite tool:
> > Occam's Razor.
>
> > The simplest explanation for the phenomena we see
> > associated with 'palatalized' dorsals is their origination
> > as dorsals + /e/ or + /y/.
>
> Since [k] is a dorsal stop, this is not an argument against
> the hypothesis that *k^ is [k] and *k is [q].
***
Patrick:
I did not say simply "dorsals"; I said "DORSALS + /e/ or +/y/.
***
> Incidentally, Ockham's razor is much more difficult to use
> properly than you seem to think: applying it to a phenomenon
> taken out of context is a classic MISuse, since it ignores
> the possibility that an increase in complexity in one area
> may be more than counterbalanced by a decrease elsewhere
> within the same system.
***
Patrick:
When you learn how to spell it, I will be glad to take your advice on using
it.
***
> >>>>> It is supremely important to retain the palatalized
> >>>>> dorsals where we can identify them because they allow us
> >>>>> to know that the pre-PIE vowel in that position was /e/.
>
> >>>> This is an argument for retaining the distinction between
> >>>> *k^ and *k; it has nothing to do with their phonetic values.
>
> >>> Then the question is meaningless. If *k^ does not
> >>> represent palatalized /k/ then the matter of markedness
> >>> becomes moot.
>
> >> Obviously. But your argument for retaining the distinction
> >> has nothing to do with this.
>
> > You are so wrong.
>
> Not in terms of the argument quoted above ('It is supremely
> important ... because ...'). It's not my problem if you
> actually had in mind a different argument.
***
Patrick:
Reading comprehension seems to be your problem.
***
> > I merely point out that palatalized dorsals are a way of
> > identifying pre-PIE DORSAL + /e/ or /j/,
>
> Which is significantly different from the argument quoted
> above.
***
Patrick:
Not to me.
***
> >>>>> 'Markedness' is a useless concept. If it had any
> >>>>> legitimacy, Khoisan could not exist with its very "marked"
> >>>>> clicks.
>
> >>>> This is an absurd straw man.
>
> >>> Why do you not explain why this is absurd?
>
> >> I thought it obvious. Markedness is just a way of talking
> >> about a probability distribution. Your claim amounts to
> >> denying the legitimacy of a probability distribution in
> >> which some entities have low but non-zero probability, which
> >> is obviously absurd. Saying that clicks are very marked is
> >> no different in principle from saying that human heights
> >> above 7 feet (~2.13 m) are marked. Your Khoisan statement
> >> has an exact parallel in 'If (height) markedness had any
> >> legitimacy, Zydrunas Ilgauskas (7' 3", 2.21 m) could not
> >> exist'.
>
> > And you completely distort what I have said. I have never
> > stated nor do I believe that some entities, like certain
> > phonemes, have low probabilities of occurrence.
>
> Oh, well, if you deny the empirical facts, then there's no
> point continuing the discussion. Or did you mean to say the
> exact opposite, that you have never *denied* that some
> entities have low probabilities of occurrence?
***
Patrick:
Good God, get glasses. I am not denying any empirical facts!
I have repeatedly stated that one can observe that some phonemes display low
frequency of occurrence.
***
> > Therefore, the frequent occurrence of an unlikely phonemes
> > in a given system does not rule out the possibility of its
> > occurrence.
>
> A perfectly unobjectionable statement -- unlike the absurd
> one to which I originally objected. Had you made *that*
> response to Glen, I'd not have objected. But you didn't.
***
Patrick:
I really do not care at all if you object or not.
***
> > The proof that you have completely misunderstood the
> > question and my responses to it is in your comical:
>
> > "Your Khoisan statement has an exact parallel in 'If
> > (height) markedness had any legitimacy, Zydrunas Ilgauskas
> > (7' 3", 2.21 m) could not exist'."
>
> > This is, in essence, _Glen's_ argument.
>
> No. Glen's argument is that because (height) markedness
> does exist, we must presume that the man behind the curtain
> is not over 7 feet tall unless we have very good evidence
> that he is. My example is, as I said, an exact paraphrase
> of yours. If you now agree that the notion of markedness
> does in fact describe an empirical reality, then I suggest
> that you figure out what it was that you actually meant to
> say. Perhaps you meant that 'X is of low probability' does
> not imply 'X does not occur', and hence that inferences from
> markedness must be made with some care?
***
Patrick:
Then, if your interpretation of Glen's argument is correct, it is still
fallacious.
I acknowledge that certain phonemes have low frequencies of occurrence (how
many times must I state it before you understand I acknowledge it?).
'Markedness' implies something in addition to mere low frequency -
particularly as Glen is misusing it.
His "inference" is simply unwarranted.
As I wrote, but you so conveniently ignored by focusing on Khoisan, English
is a language in which /i/ and /e/ in addition to /y/ palatalize preceding
consonants. Also, in English, [e] (= /e/ and /i/) is the vowel which has the
highest frequency of occurrence. By Glen's twisted inference from low
frequency of occurrence, English should not exist. /e/, by itself, is
"marked" since the predominantly occurring vowel in the world's languages is
/a/.
Now, tell me, one valid inference about a language that _can_ be made from
low frequency of a given phoneme aside from originating in a loan from a
foreign language.
Can you do it? Or is "markedness" just another toy for Kantians?
***
> Brian