Re[6]: [tied] *kW- "?"

At 14:09:09 on Friday, 16 September 2005, Patrick Ryan
wrote:

> From: "Brian M. Scott" <BMScott@...>

>>> It is certainly clear to me and any objective observer
>>> what 'motivated' means in this context. Palatalization
>>> occurs rather regularly before front vowels and /y/ in
>>> innumerbale languages.

>> Of course. It is fairly clear that some changes are
>> likelier than others; that says nothing about whether all
>> linguistic changes are motivated, or whether (or how) such a
>> statement is even meaningful. It is also clear that some
>> changes have no obvious motivation. And anyone who thinks
>> seriously about what actually constitutes an explanation in
>> historical linguistics -- and 'this change is motivated by
>> X' is typically presented as an explanation -- must soon
>> realize that the question isn't at all simple.

> Ah, now you have identified the _real_ problem. Because a
> motivation is not _obvious_ does not mean it is absent.

Nor did I imply otherwise. However, you cannot defend the
position that all changes are motivated by claiming that
when no motivation is known, we simply haven't discovered it
yet: that argument is circular.

> In this universe, all effects have causes.

That's far from clear: consider vacuum energy and creation
of virtual particles.

> And here, I must tritely employ a favorite tool:
> Occam's Razor.

> The simplest explanation for the phenomena we see
> associated with 'palatalized' dorsals is their origination
> as dorsals + /e/ or + /y/.

Since [k] is a dorsal stop, this is not an argument against
the hypothesis that *k^ is [k] and *k is [q].

Incidentally, Ockham's razor is much more difficult to use
properly than you seem to think: applying it to a phenomenon
taken out of context is a classic MISuse, since it ignores
the possibility that an increase in complexity in one area
may be more than counterbalanced by a decrease elsewhere
within the same system.

>>>>> It is supremely important to retain the palatalized
>>>>> dorsals where we can identify them because they allow us
>>>>> to know that the pre-PIE vowel in that position was /e/.

>>>> This is an argument for retaining the distinction between
>>>> *k^ and *k; it has nothing to do with their phonetic values.

>>> Then the question is meaningless. If *k^ does not
>>> represent palatalized /k/ then the matter of markedness
>>> becomes moot.

>> Obviously. But your argument for retaining the distinction
>> has nothing to do with this.

> You are so wrong.

Not in terms of the argument quoted above ('It is supremely
important ... because ...'). It's not my problem if you
actually had in mind a different argument.

> I merely point out that palatalized dorsals are a way of
> identifying pre-PIE DORSAL + /e/ or /j/,

Which is significantly different from the argument quoted
above.

>>>>> 'Markedness' is a useless concept. If it had any
>>>>> legitimacy, Khoisan could not exist with its very "marked"
>>>>> clicks.

>>>> This is an absurd straw man.

>>> Why do you not explain why this is absurd?

>> I thought it obvious. Markedness is just a way of talking
>> about a probability distribution. Your claim amounts to
>> denying the legitimacy of a probability distribution in
>> which some entities have low but non-zero probability, which
>> is obviously absurd. Saying that clicks are very marked is
>> no different in principle from saying that human heights
>> above 7 feet (~2.13 m) are marked. Your Khoisan statement
>> has an exact parallel in 'If (height) markedness had any
>> legitimacy, Zydrunas Ilgauskas (7' 3", 2.21 m) could not
>> exist'.

> And you completely distort what I have said. I have never
> stated nor do I believe that some entities, like certain
> phonemes, have low probabilities of occurrence.

Oh, well, if you deny the empirical facts, then there's no
point continuing the discussion. Or did you mean to say the
exact opposite, that you have never *denied* that some
entities have low probabilities of occurrence?

> Therefore, the frequent occurrence of an unlikely phonemes
> in a given system does not rule out the possibility of its
> occurrence.

A perfectly unobjectionable statement -- unlike the absurd
one to which I originally objected. Had you made *that*
response to Glen, I'd not have objected. But you didn't.

> The proof that you have completely misunderstood the
> question and my responses to it is in your comical:

> "Your Khoisan statement has an exact parallel in 'If
> (height) markedness had any legitimacy, Zydrunas Ilgauskas
> (7' 3", 2.21 m) could not exist'."

> This is, in essence, _Glen's_ argument.

No. Glen's argument is that because (height) markedness
does exist, we must presume that the man behind the curtain
is not over 7 feet tall unless we have very good evidence
that he is. My example is, as I said, an exact paraphrase
of yours. If you now agree that the notion of markedness
does in fact describe an empirical reality, then I suggest
that you figure out what it was that you actually meant to
say. Perhaps you meant that 'X is of low probability' does
not imply 'X does not occur', and hence that inferences from
markedness must be made with some care?

Brian